Critical Tax Theory: Still Not Taken Seriously by Shurtz, Nancy E.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 76 | Number 5 Article 17
6-1-1998
Critical Tax Theory: Still Not Taken Seriously
Nancy E. Shurtz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nancy E. Shurtz, Critical Tax Theory: Still Not Taken Seriously, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1837 (1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol76/iss5/17
CRITICAL TAX THEORY: STILL NOT TAKEN
SERIOUSLY
NANCY E. SHURTZ*
[F]eminism is about taking all women seriously, which
requires eliciting the differences and conflicts among
women.
1
But in the overall feminist scheme of things, any arguable
injustice caused by QTIPs to affluent (and overwhelmingly
white) widows is simply trivial.'
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said: "Taxes are what we
pay for civilized society ... ." In many dimensions of our collective
daily lives it is clear that many among us have been denied access to
the fruits of civilized existence. The American ideal of every citizen
enjoying an equal opportunity to exercise actively the rights to "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" is not and has not been the
reality for women, people of color, or children either today or
yesterday.4 The "civilized society" to which Justice Holmes alluded
* Nancy E. Shurtz is a professor at the University of Oregon School of Law, where
she teaches taxation, estate planning, and women and the law. I would like to thank my
research assistant Scot Ferguson for rendering invaluable assistance in the preparation of
this article.
1. Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 115, 116. "[B]y
urging modes of analysis that pay attention to the varieties of human experience and to
the complex interplay between experience and knowledge, feminists dispute the first
premises against which consistency and coherence are typically measured." Id at 137.
2. Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1521
(1998).
3. Companfa de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927).
4. See Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
383, 384, 394-99 (1994). Despite record numbers employed in the paid labor force,
women still experience high rates of poverty across all age groups, most concentrated
among African-Americans. Professor Williams traces the origins of this widespread
deprivation to historical practices that denied women access to property ownership. See
id. at 385-90. She argues that in contemporary society, the majority of assets that
constitute "wealth" take the form of human capital (education, skills, work experience,
etc.), which in turn are translated into the ability to command resources in the
marketplace. See id. at 392-96. Due to the constraining influences of socially prescribed
gender roles that maintain women's primary responsibility for childcare and legal
doctrines in family and divorce law that limit women's claims to the fruits of human
capital, women and their children are particularly vulnerable to the ravages of poverty,
with bleak prospects of escape. See id. at 396-402.
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may rightly be said to be inhabited chiefly by men, and most
prominently by affluent, powerful white men.5 Several currents of
feminist thought,6 as well as Critical Race Theory,7 dedicate much of
Though it is projected that by the year 2000 more than half the paid labor force will
come from households comprised of dual-earner married couples, household labor
remains decidedly an unpaid, one-worker affair-the woman's. Data from recent surveys
of married couples analyzed by sociologist Patricia Ulbrich revealed that wives averaged
some 32.3 hours of housework per week, compared with only 8.7 hours for their husbands.
These figures applied only to housework, and did not include child care. See Jim
Thornton, Time to Re-Examine Your Division of Household Labor and Work Toward
Domestic Detente, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 2,1997, at Fl.
5. Despite comprising 53% of the American electorate, women are grossly
underrepresented in the halls of government at both the national and state levels.
Women currently occupy less than 12% of the total seats (60 of 535) in Congress-
including only 9 (of 100) in the Senate. At the state level, women are governors in but 2
of the 50 states, and though they are somewhat more visible in state legislative
assemblies, they still hold only 21.5% of these seats nationwide. See John S. Day, Women
Senators Seek Common PoliticalAgenda, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Nov. 20, 1997, at A2.
Women and minorities are also all but locked out of the boardrooms of the nation's
largest corporations. More than 95% of top-level management of Fortune 500 companies
are white men, while less than one-half of one percent of these firms are headed by
women. See Barbara Jones, Giving Women the Business: On Winning, Losing and
Leaving the Corporate Game, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1997, at 47, 47. Racial minorities
are also minor presences on the boards of America's corporations. Of 7000 corporate
directors across the nation, fewer than 250 are African-American-less than four percent.
Even smaller numbers of Latinos and Asians are represented on corporate boards. See
William Reed, Blacks and Corporate Boards, TENN. TRIB., Feb. 6,1997, at 18.
6. Early feminist thought was influenced and inspired by successes of the civil rights
movement of the 1950s and '60s that secured formal recognition of African-Americans'
equal rights under the law. Feminists' own efforts focused on achieving formal equality
for women in areas widely acknowledged to be men's domains, particularly in the paid
labor market. Divergent views sprouted over the desirability of having women become
"just like men," and ushered in a new era of feminist exploration of the nature of
womanhood and women's relationships to established social, political, and economic
institutions. This expansion of feminist inquiry continues unabated, as evidenced by the
number of feminist "schools" of thought represented in the literature. Feminist
methodology varies widely as well, much of it still devoted to advancing women's standing
relative to men's within the prevailing social and institutional framework, while others
seek to "deconstruct" these same fixtures for being bastions of oppression in their own
right. See MARY FRANCIS BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 59-63 (1986); FLORA DAVIS,
MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1960, at 33-
48, 69-80 (1991).
For an excellent sampling of the rich variety of contemporary feminist thought, see
MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:
TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 50-154 (1994), presenting excerpts from the works of
Catharine A. MacKinnon (representing "dominance" theory, which regards gender as a
system of male supremacy and female subordination), see id. at 52, Sylvia A. Law
(representing the "formal equality" school, which seeks explicit legal recognition of
women's rights to equal treatment with men), see id. at 82, Robin West (representing
"hedonic" feminism, which emphasizes women's real experiences of pain and pleasure),
see id. at 90, Margaret Jane Radin (representing "pragmatic" theory, a highly
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their attention to identifying and exposing the, imprint of the "power
elite" on social and political institutions (and the laws that support
them) that systematically relegate women and minorities to
subordinate status in virtually all aspects of American life. In legal
scholarship, gender and race bias has been explored extensively in
such diverse areas as family,8 tort,9 contract,' corporate," criminal,'2
contextualized approach which "confront[s] each dilemma separately and choose[s] the
alternative that will hinder empowerment the least and further it the most"), id. at 98,
100, Zillah Eisenstein (representing "socialist" feminism, which "analyzes power in terms
of class origins as well as its patriarchal roots"), see id. at 104, 105, Jane Flax
(representing "postmodern" feminism, which criticizes the purported autonomy of
reason, objective trust, and science, and which widely employs the method of
"deconstruction"), see id. at 110, and Adrienne Rich (representing "lesbianism," which
resists heterosexuality as an oppressive institution), see id. at 135. The boundaries of
these categories are, of course, imprecise at the least, but suggest the dynamic tenor of
contemporary feminist inquiry.
7. See infra notes 211-39 and accompanying text (discussing Critical Race Theory
("CRT")). For a rich and varied sampling of writings from the CRT catalog, see
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTITNG EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
8. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133 (1992); Naomi R. Calm, Civil Images of Battered
Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV.
1041 (1991); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows": Toward a
History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819; Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption
Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 33 (1993-94); Merle H. Weiner, "We Are Family". Valuing Associationalism in
Disputes Over Children's Surnames, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1625 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J. 848; Martha Chamallas, Questioning
the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A
Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1994); Thomas Koenig & Michael
Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1995); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial Justice,
48 RUTGERS L. REv. 761 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual
Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996);
Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 887 (1997); Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussions
of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889 (1997); Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance,
and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial
Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stan& Feminist and Other
Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387
(1992); Katherine Hall, Starting from Silence: The Future of Feminist Analysis of
Corporate Law, 7 CORP. & BUS. L.J. 149 (1994); Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter,
Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23
OSGOODE HALL LJ. 543 (1985); Ramona L. Paetzold, Commentary, Feminism and
Business Law: The Essential Interconnection, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 699 (1993).
12. See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural
Preemption: A Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101 (1997); Binny Miller, Give
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employment, 3  and environmental law.14  This same "critical"
approach of challenging the nature and character of dominant
institutions has been applied across a variety of disciplines, ranging
from economics 5 to history,6 higher education, 7 and the fields of
science.' However, largely absent from these efforts has been
Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV.
485 (1994); Tonya Plank, How Would the Criminal Law Treat Sethe?: Reflections on
Patriarchy, Child Abuse, and the Uses of Narrative to Re-Imagine Motherhood, 12 WIs.
WOMEN'S LJ. 83 (1997); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape
Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989); Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at
Work? 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815 (1996); Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting, and
Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 61 (1997); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of
Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J.
1619 (1991).
14. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All: It's the Right Thing to Do, 9
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 281 (1994); Christopher C. Joyner & George E. Little, It's Not Nice
to Fool Mother Nature! The Mystique of Feminist Approaches to International
Environmental Law, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 223 (1996); Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice:
The Legal Meaning of a Social Movement, 15 J.L. & COM. 597 (1996).
15. See, e.g., BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds.,
1993); JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJECrIVITY AND ECONOMICS (1996); OUT OF THE
MARGIN: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS (Edith Kuiper & Jolande Sap eds.,
1995).
16. See, e.g., DIANA H. COOLE, WOMEN IN POLITICAL THEORY: FROM ANCIENT
MISOGYNY TO CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM (1993) (tracing the origins of western
women's subjugation in the literature and philosophy of ancient Greece and bringing the
process through the era of classical liberalism to contemporary deconstructionist
paradigms); MICHAEL LEWIS GOLDBERG, AN ARMY OF WOMEN: GENDER AND
POLrrICS IN GILDED AGE KANSAS (1997) (exploring the role of women's movements for
suffrage and temperance in the vanguard of populist groundswells that sprang up
throughout much of late nineteenth-century America, as well as examining the interplay
between these well-organized and influential women's efforts and the prevailing
conservative (and male) ruling order, and its parallel with features of today's feminist
political struggles); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985) (tracing the development of family-
law doctrine throughout the last century, a process whose legacy is still felt in what the
author terms a "judicial patriarchy" in which the courts still wield enormous influence in
defining the contours of considerations of both family relations and gender issues).
17. See, e.g., FEMINIST PERSPECIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECrS OF LAW
(Anne Bottomley ed., 1996) (presenting various feminist critiques of traditional teaching
contents and methods employed across a broad swath of courses offered in British law
schools); ADRIANA HERNANDEZ, PEDAGOGY, DEMOCRACY, AND FEMINISM:
RETHINKING THE PUBLIC SPHERE (1997) (arguing for a transformation of the
educational mission away from a "how to" orientation, attuned to skill acquisition and
employment readiness, to one in which principles of community welfare, social justice,
and democratic political activism are integrated into curricula to develop a more
responsible citizenry); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal
Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
61 (1988).
18. See, e.g., BODY/POLITICS: WOMEN AND THE DISCOURSE OF SCIENCE (Mary
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examination of the role played by the taxation system in undergirding
this hierarchy, chiefly through its subsidization of wealth acquisition
and concentration (and its adjunct, social and political power), while
concurrently exacerbating the subordinate status and relative
impoverishment of the remaining sectors of society.19 Now change is
afoot. This void in the catalog of taxation literature is rapidly being
filled with fresh studies and commentaries on the relationships
between the taxation system and the social, economic, and political
standing of "traditionally subordinated groups."'20
Even with this recent injection of new blood into the literature,
critical tax scholarship may be said still to be in an embryonic state of
development. Spawned in the waters of early feminist commentaries
on taxation issues, it has experienced a lengthy gestation period.
Three primary factors have influenced this slow pace of evolution.
First, much of early feminist work was squarely framed in a
"liberal"2' analysis that mirrored the rights-oriented approach to
Jacobus et al. eds., 1990); FEMINISM AND SCIENCE (Evelyn Fox Keller & Helen E.
Longino eds., 1996); SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986);
CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT, SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF
WOMANHOOD (1989); SEX AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY (Sandra Harding & Jean F. O'Barr
eds., 1987); WOMEN LOOK AT BIOLOGY LOOKING AT WOMEN: A COLLECTION OF
FEMINIST CRrrIQUES (Ruth Hubbard et al. eds., 1979).
19. See Regina Austin, Nest Eggs and Stormy Weather: Law, Culture, and Black
Women's Lack of Wealth, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 767, 772-74 (1997). Professor Austin
identifies the taxation structure as a major "structural impediment" to the accumulation
of wealth-building assets by black women. See id. at 772-73. Many taxation provisions
subsidize asset accumulation, such as deductions for home mortgage interest, see I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(1), (h)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1998), or for employers' contributions to qualified
employee pension plans, see id. § 404(a). However, due to a variety of factors, including
low wages, job insecurity, and discriminatory barriers to obtaining financing, such
taxation benefits are largely unavailable to black women, contributing to the continuing
wide gap between white and black levels of wealth and income. See Austin, supra, at 773-
75.
20. Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction to TAXING AMERICA 2
(Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996); see also Dorothy A. Brown, The
Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA, supra, at 45; Beverly I.
Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L.
REV. 751, 753; john a. powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policies Have Racially
Segregated America, in TAXING AMERICA, supra, at 80, 83; Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender
Equity and Tax Policy: The Theory of "Taxing Men," 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 485 (1997). For a discussion of the Moran and Whitford article, see infra notes
217-39 and accompanying text.
21. In a recent article, I commented on the liberal tradition:
The liberal tradition bridges a span of time from the dawn of the Enlightenment
down to the present moment, from John Locke's discourses on "natural rights"
to John Rawls' statement of the "original position." Liberal thought is founded
upon an acknowledgment of innate individual rights, equality between
individuals and the exercise of free choice. Individual preference and action are
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women's egalitarian efforts of the time. These early feminists gave
primary attention to the removal of impediments to women's
autonomy and exercise of liberty within established economic and
social structures, principally through prescriptions that encouraged
women's increased participation in market labor.' Even though the
inclusion of women's issues on the table of taxation debate was a
victory in its own right, early feminist taxation analysis was shaped
along decidedly standard contours. Labels have changed slightly
over time, but traditional terms of analysis are for the most part
variations of five principal criteria that consistently appear in
taxation design discussions, and that bear a resemblance to principles
said to be a product of rationality. Rationality employs the human capacity to
reason, and is the tool by which maximum self-fulfillment is pursued. Social
relationships are grounded both in the establishment of respect for individual
initiative and preferences and in equality of opportunity. Social institutions
(government, the market, etc.) are the meeting grounds at which the disparate
interests and exercise of individual preferences are arbitrated, spawning the
creation of collective agreement and cooperative venture in laws, economies,
and the like. The role of social institutions is not to direct or guide individual
choice, but to maximize its free exercise among all the members of the
community. This applies to the aggregated resources of the society, in which the
dual objectives of promoting the individual pursuit of self-fulfillment and
maintaining respect for one's access to a fair share of society's resources
intersect. In the present inquiry, the role of tax may be seen as a tool to bridge
these seemingly conflicting social objectives.
Shurtz, supra note 20, at 486 n.5.
22. See Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income
Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971). Blumberg
identified the joint filing provision for married couples as the source of "a strong pattern
of work disincentive for married women and inequitable treatment of the two-earner
family," further characterizing it as "an instrument of social control." Id. at 49, 51-54; see
also infra notes 64-88 and accompanying text.
Later commentaries expanded on Blumberg's finding of a work disincentive effect
against married women, leading to proposals for abandonment of the marital taxation
unit and a return to mandatory individual filing. See Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning
Marital Status As a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TFX. L. REv. 1, 34-39
(1980) (noting that by 1979, two-earner married couples outnumbered their single-earner
married counterparts, further undermining justification for a taxation regime that
benefited a shrinking minority classification of taxpayers); Linda Sands Moerschbaecher,
The Marriage Penalty and the Divorce Bonus: A Comparative Examination of the Current
Legislative Proposals, 5 REv. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 133, 135 (1981) (contending that "no
valid tax policy or reason exists for allowing a hypothetical income split with a spouse,
usually a wife, where no real split of income or control of assets has occurred"); Alicia H.
Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual Under the Federal Personal Income Tax, in
THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 247 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980);
Laura Ann Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing
System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197, 198-99 (1988) (arguing that any incentive in the taxation
system that discourages married women from entering the paid work force hurts the
standing of all women through the reinforcement of "traditional, patriarchal stereotypes
about the female role in family and society").
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of classical liberalism.3 These are: horizontal equity,24 ability to
pay, 2 neutrality,26 efficiency,27 and political feasibility.28  These
considerations relate to a given tax regime's degree of overall
"fairness."'29  This begs the question: "Fairness to whom?"3  The
traditional liberal orientation toward the individual necessarily
23. See Shurtz, supra note 20, at 486 n.5.
24. "Horizontal equity" is concerned with treating equally situated taxpayers alike.
It is most closely associated with liberal notions of formal equality between individual
parties in a society. There are inherent difficulties attached to this principal in the federal
tax system, most notably those associated with the selection of the marital unit as the
taxation entity of reference for the entire system. Disparities exist both between married
couples (for example, one-earner "traditional" marriages and two-earner couples) and
between married and unmarried couples who may in every other respect but legal marital
status be "equally situated."
25. "Ability to pay" is a principle most closely aligned with liberal ideals of equality
of opportunity for all citizens. Problematic elements that accompany this concept concern
what to tax (for example, income, consumption, wealth) as well as whom to tax (for
example, the individual, the married couple, the household).
26. "Neutrality" relates to liberal notions of autonomy and the exercise of
unconstrained choice. Taxes are, therefore, thought to be best when they exert as little
influence as possible on individual choices. Even the casual observer knows, however,
that the taxation system attempts to encourage certain behaviors and choices, such as
saving and investment, through various tax deductions and rate reductions, while
discouraging other behaviors, such as drinking, by imposing high taxes on alcoholic
beverages. Such taxation features are legion.
27. "Efficiency" is closely related to neutrality and is oriented towards the workings
of the free market, promoting the liberal notion of maximizing personal utility through
the exercise of one's preferences. Efficiency considerations often overlap and conflict
with aims of other criteria, such as ability to pay. Choice of tax base, for instance, is often
argued on efficiency grounds (the consumption vs. income debate) as is the tax rate
structure (flat tax vs. graduated progressive tax).
28. "Political feasibility" reflects the traditional liberal notion of government as
arbitrator between the competing interests of a diverse citizenry and as a guarantor of
access to a basic share of collective resources necessary for the exercise of individual
liberty. Critics of this ideal charge that government cannot be a fair broker for a diverse
population because its authority is vested in the interests of the dominant social class. For
radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon, for instance, all established social and
political institutions are permeated with a "male" soul that is oppressive to women. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215, 237
(1989). "In male supremacist societies, the male standpoint dominates civil society in the
form of the objective standard-that standpoint which, because it dominates in the world,
does not appear to function as a standpoint at all." Id. at 237.
29. Professors Brown and Fellows consider three criteria to be central to traditional
tax analysis: economic neutrality, objectivity, and progressivity. Their stated orientation,
however, is toward elements in taxation design that retard the causes of social justice. See
Brown & Fellows, supra note 20, at 3-4.
30. See Williams, supra note 10, at 187-88. Williams stresses the importance of the
role of law in shaping the moral posture of society. With regard to race relations, for
instance, law that tolerates discrimination denies claims of a fair and just society, denies a
social makeup that "is quickly becoming a nation of minorities," and is ineffective and
inefficient. Id at 188. He was referring specifically to contract law, but these principles
are equally applicable in the construction of taxation law.
1998] 1843
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
limited the scope of analysis to taxation's effect on women at the
micro-level,31 but did not address or consider women as a subjugated
class. Of course, there is a host of other criteria that are of some
importance to creation of a well-designed taxation system, but many
of these are not the foci of contentious discourse.3 2
In addition to the influence of liberalism in defining its
orientation, much of tax scholarship tends to view the tax system as
being in isolation 33-separated from the dynamics of the
sociopolitical realm, and largely unrelated to other sectors in the
galaxy of legal discourse.3' This separation stems significantly from
traditional views that taxation law reflects principles of objective
neutrality, and in this resembles other pseudo-sciences such as-
economics.' Hence taxation has been viewed to be largely unrelated
31. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 22, at 54-56 (principally focusing on identifying
features in the tax code that inhibited women's exercise of autonomy). Blumberg points
out that from the time the 1948 tax reforms were enacted until 1971, income splitting was
almost universally viewed to be an advantage to married couples, even though it always
conferred its greatest tax benefits on one-earner couples, "reflecting and reinforcing a
traditional and, arguably, outmoded family pattern." Id. at 55-56.
32. The obvious need for a levy to generate adequate revenues, as well as a reliable
method of collection, are among the other vital, but less controversial, issues of
consideration in taxation design. There are also a number of what have been termed
"micro-criteria" for evaluating tax structures. For the classic presentation of these
themes, see Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 567 (1965). See also Nancy E. Shurtz, A Critical View of Traditional Tax Policy
Theory: A Pragmatic Alternative, 31 VILL. L REv. 1665 (1986) (criticizing traditional tax
policy criteria for representing conflicting principles that preclude the creation and
implementation of a coherent, unified taxation structure, and arguing that a central focus
on efficient revenue generation would yield a far better tax system than the current
regime composed of ad hoc measures).
33. See Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender
Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259,260-61 (1988).
34. In the policymaking realm, this perceived separation of tax law from other areas
of law constitutes what is termed a "tax myopia." See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or
Mama Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REv. 517 (1994).
"Tax myopia," Professor Caron explains, is grounded in the perpetuation of two myths:
"The first myth is that tax lawyers are somehow different from other lawyers.... [T]he
related second myth [is] that tax law is somehow different from other areas of the law."
Id. at 518. These myths, in turn, are products of non-integrated application and
consideration of tax and non-tax law in all three branches of the federal government,
resulting in a sort of "separate spheres" mindset that Professor Caron identifies as
crippling to the creation of effective legislation in many vital areas of the public interest.
See id. at 531-54 (Congress); id. at 554-73 (Treasury Department); id. at 573-89 (courts).
Caron calls for efforts to adopt "synergistic approaches" to tax and non-tax
considerations that can materially improve the legislative and judicial processes. See id.
at 574-89 (discussing reform options).
35. See NELSON, supra note 15, at 22. As applied in standard contemporary
economics,
[o]bjectivity is assumed to be assured by adherence to positive (that is, value-
1844 [Vol. 76
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to more volatile (politically charged) areas of law and has been
underutilized as a tool of more general legal reform, but this scene is
beginning to change.36 Third, women, minorities, and those of
modest financial means are underrepresented in the taxation field,37
relative to other areas of law, and in the halls of legal education,
where feminist and critical race scholarship has been marginalized by
established denizens of the academy. Initially, dismissal came in the
form of non-acknowledgment.39 When these movements did not fade
free) analysis, an arm's-length detachment from practical or political concerns,
the use of formal and mathematical methods, and the search for ever more
general theories. This image is defined in opposition to notions of intuition,
vagueness, subjectivity, political concern, verbal and informal analysis, and
explanations of particular phenomena, all of which are assumed to be less than
scientific.
Id. Within taxation policy, Nelson believes these notions influence a tax structure that is
oriented toward autonomy and individuality rather than toward honoring the web of
relationships that comprises a society. She advocates adoption of a taxation system
featuring the individual "in relation" as her unit of reference. See Julie A. Nelson, Tax
Reform and Feminist Theory in the United States: Incorporating Human Connection, 18 J.
ECON. STUD. 11, 23 (1991).
36. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91
Nw. U. L. Rav. 1 (1996). Silbaugh ties the sources of nonrecognition of the economic
value of housework (reflected in such features of the tax system as the nontaxability of
imputed income and the marital taxation "bonus" that accrues to married couples with
stay-at-home wives) to similar legal nonrecognition in other areas of law, such as labor
law. Paid domestic workers are not only one of the lowest-paid professional populations,
but are among the least protected by law, being exempt from "all of the National Labor
Relations Act, from coverage under the Occupational Safety and Health Act coverage
[sic], and from much of workers' compensation law." Id. at 72.
Mary Heen has examined the role the tax system may play in integrating child care
provisions more effectively in ongoing welfare reform efforts. Current child care
assistance programs suffer from insufficient funding at both the state and federal levels,
making mandatory work requirements inherent in welfare reform difficult for poor
parents to successfully satisfy. Nonintegration of the welfare reform system with an
effective child care assistance system (which could include refundable tax credits, direct
subsidies, or a combination thereof) inhibits the successful attainment of policy goals on
both fronts. See Mary L. Heen, Welfare Reform, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Delivering
Increased Work-Related Child Care Benefits to Low-Income Families, 13 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 173 (1995).
37. See Caron, supra note 34, at 526-31. Professor Caron notes that even as women
are increasing their ranks in the legal profession generally, "tax practice has become more
isolated from other areas of law by remaining primarily a men's club." Id. at 526; see also
Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the
Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REv. 766, 767 (1997) (noting that while ethnic
minorities comprise about 25% of the population of the United States, they comprise only
about 8% of the total population of lawyers, and only 2% of the partners in the nation's
largest law firms).
38. See Paetzold, supra note 11, at 700.
39. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561-66 (1984).
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into oblivion but garnered new adherents and became impossible to
ignore, mainstream scholars employed new and varied strategies to
devalue the content of critical commentary. 0
Such attention, albeit of a variety intended to dismiss and
discredit, may be seen as a sign of progress. If imitation is truly the
sincerest form of flattery, then open resistance from those who have
previously ignored you must, in some quarters, rank a close runner-
up. In this light, the fledgling realm of critical tax scholarship may
have graduated to a higher level of maturation, as evidenced by the
appearance of a review of its literature by Lawrence Zelenak,41 a
leading fixture in the firmament of taxation scholarship. This article
examines the character and content of present critical tax scholarship,
employing Zelenak's commentary as a point of departure and of
constructive comparison and as a foundation for a glimpse at future
avenues of inquiry for this exciting and emerging area of law.
Zelenak examines an array of feminist writings (as well as one
entry from the critical race perspective) that relate to several leading
and controversial issues in the taxation field, and renders his opinions
on the relative virtues and demerits of these offerings. While he
acknowledges that academic address of taxation's relationship to
matters of class, race, and gender "is long overdue," 42 he is generally
dismayed by the content of critical tax literature, "troubled that much
of the work has not been carefully done.14  He states four general
criticisms of feminist/critical tax analysis. First, he believes that the
literature is too eager to accuse the law of being openly hostile to
women and blacks. 4 He ascribes this wayward tendency to a failure
to view the inherent conflict in feminist doctrine of encouraging
women in traditional gender roles to assume new roles while at the
same time composing programs designed to help the material
position of these same women in their traditional roles.45 Related to
this criticism is his second charge that feminist commentators often
do not examine the criticisms of other feminists when shaping their
opinions.' Third, he believes that (especially) the critical race
theorists are arbitrary in the choice of laws they examine, and that
40. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize
Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1352-68 (1992).
41. See Zelenak, supra note 2.
42. Id. at 1522.
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this leads to biased analyses.47 Finally, he believes that not enough
thought goes into constructing solutions to the problems these
authors set forth.'
Through examination of the works that reside at the epicenter of
these criticisms-articles by Marjorie Kornhauser,4 9 Gwen Thayer
Handelman,50 Mary Louise Fellows,5' Wendy Gerzog,52 Nancy
Staudt,53 and Beverly Moran and William Whitford54---I will
demonstrate that Zelenak misses important substantive elements of
the pieces he reviews, revealing a basic misunderstanding of the
mission of critical scholarship. I believe this misunderstanding owes
much to his adherence to a form of normative discourse55 that
47. See id. at 1523-24.
48. See id. at 1524.
49. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987).
50. See Gwen Thayer Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 3 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1993).
51. See Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers," 10
LAW & INEO. J. 137 (1991).
52. See Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: ' Illogical and
Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995).
53. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996).
54. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 20.
55. The standard form of normative legal analysis is said to follow the form of the
lawyer's brief. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 801, 930 (1991) ("The lawyer's brief begins with a statement of jurisdiction, a
statement of the issues, the discussion of the fact, the argument of law, and then the
request for judicial relief. Normative legal thought closely tracks this structure, and when
it is complete, there is a conclusion.").
Paul Brest echoes this characterization, concluding that "most of our writings are not
political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade
the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good." Paul Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981). Normative legal analysis "assesses
decisionmaking authority, competence, procedures, criteria, and results." IdL at 1063 n.1.
Cognitive model theory employs the metaphor of "purposes are destinations" to
construct a "source-path-goal schema" that closely parallels the form of normative legal
theory. GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 275 (1987). Lakoff's construct consists of a
source ("[t]he state where the desire [purpose] is unfulfilled and no action toward
fulfilling it has been taken"), a path ("[tjhe sequence of actions that allow one to achieve
the purpose"), and a goal ("[t]he desired state is the endpoint"). Id. at 278. These
constructs are powerful devices because they often correspond with sequences of personal
experiences. Because of this correspondence, such schemata seem to represent natural
processes of inquiry that are viewed in some quarters as intrinsically superior paths to
knowledge. See id. Professor Zelenak labels such a tightly constrained mode of discourse
as the "right way" to approach issues of taxation policy. See infra notes 81-90 and
accompanying text.
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suggests employment of a universal blueprint56 for scholarship which
allows scant room for deviation from the mold. Zelenak's stringent
observance of a prescribed discursive form precludes him from
discerning some of the intended meanings projected in these pieces
by the authors whom he criticizes-in short, he "misses the point. '5 7
56. Normative models employing universally applied principles are not new, of
course. Kant, for instance, developed a sophisticated theory of ethics based on individual
autonomy and free will, elements filtered, however, through individuals' experiences of
nurturance and interaction with others. An individuality defined by social interaction
breeds a commonality of interests known to advance human experience, and provides the
foundation for the application of universal principles to guide individual conduct. See
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Thomas Kingsmill Abbot trans.,
Longmans, Green and Co. 1923). Kant viewed moral actions as those that are based on
the application of principles, the force enabling such applications being reason. See id. at
29. Reason, in turn, is subject to the commands of necessity, which Kant divided into
those required to achieve a particular end (for example, happiness), and those which are
considered necessary of themselves "without reference to another end, i.e. as objectively
necessary." Id. at 31. This latter variety reflects the essence of the "categorical
imperative." Id. Translated to the field of action, this imperative commands one to "[a]ct
as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature." Id. at
39. For an overview of the development of normative concepts in Western philosophy,
see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Normative Question, in THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY
7, 7-48 (Onora O'Neill ed., 1996).
This common orientation of both the autonomous individual and the larger social
construct lends itself to examination of social phenomena through modes of rational
thought, most conspicuously embodied in the scientific method. See GEORGE H. MEAD,
MIND, SELF & SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST 388
(Charles W. Morris ed., 1934). In addressing ethical social questions,
[s]cience ... can give a method for approach: recognize all the facts that belong
to the problem, so that the hypothesis will be a consistent, rational one.... The
only rule that an ethics can present is that an individual should rationally deal
with all the values that are found in a specific problem ... and then make out a
plan of action which will rationally deal with those interests. That is the only
method that ethics can bring to the individual.
Id.
A modem theory that employs universality is discourse theory, identified principally
with the works of Juirgen Habermas. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
(William Rehg trans., 1996). In this construct, norms in any social context are justified
through consensus. Consensus is often a process of compromise, a product of interplay
between what Habermas calls "facticity and validity," or the tension than exists between
the real life experiences of disparate groups in society, and the sets of idealized standards
against which shared perspectives are deemed reasonable. See id. at 21-24. Rules and
standards are fair and just when the widest and freest participation in the processes of
interpersonal exchange and discourse is encouraged and facilitated. These processes
require popular access to the workings of the "political public sphere," which consists of
the political, institutional and "private sectors of the lifeworld" which includes the mass
communication media. See id. at 373, 376-79. For a treatment of the theoretical
underpinnings of discourse theory, see JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984).
57. Richard Delgado believes this ability to misread the work of outsider legal
scholars is characteristic of a group of "old-line, inner-circle scholars" who "resort to an
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This failure is particularly evident in his criticism that proposed
solutions to taxation problems are inadequately considered or are
absent altogether,58 a lament decrying the sad state of critical
scholarship that is reminiscent of criticisms by other mainstream
scholars who resisted the insurgency into the academy of the critical
legal studies movement in the 1980s.59 Zelenak also misreads these
works through a phenomenon Patricia Cain calls "gendered
misunderstanding," 6 produced by the inability of many men to
identify with accounts of reality based on women's experiences and
perspectives. In addition, on more than one occasion he "selectively
ignores"'" passages from the authors that would otherwise refute one
or more of the critical claims he levels at their arguments, and in his
discussion of difference feminism, he engages in discourse laced with
arsenal of mechanisms to reduce its [outsider scholarship] impact." Delgado, supra note
40, at 1358.
At least one other tax scholar believes that Professor Zelenak has grossly misread his
work through the imposition of normative positions upon arguments that were never
intended to reflect normative postures or prescribe policy. See Louis Kaplow, The
Income Tax Versus the Consumption Tax and the Tax Treatment of Human Capital, 51
TAX L. REV. 35, 35-36, 39 (1995) (responding to a commentary by Professor Zelenak);
Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes and
Human Capital, 51 TAXL. REV. 1 (1995) (commenting on Kaplow's thinking).
58. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1524. "It is unfair to criticize current law for its
effects on women or blacks without showing a way to do better; more important, mere
critique without a workable solution does nothing to better anyone's situation." Id.
Much of outsider jurisprudential writing is deliberately nonprescriptive in form,
however. A substantial reason for this is that many outsider scholars believe that before
substantive political and policy changes can occur that will yield tangible benefits to
traditionally oppressed populations, these people's perspectives must be heard and their
experiences known on a wide scale. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 429-32
(1987). Williams writes that the narratives of blacks serve both to empower them in
claiming their full measure of the rights of citizenship and to help whites to "learn to
appreciate the communion of blacks in more than body, as more than the perpetually
neotenized, mothering non-mother. They must recognize us as kin.... They must learn
to listen and speak to the grieving, enraged black-people-within-themselves and within
our society." lIL at 429.
59. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227
(1984) (labeling critical legal studies writers "nihilists" who "engage in teaching that
knowingly dispirits students or disables them from doing the work for which they are
trained," adding that in their "honest effort to proclaim a need for revolution, nihilist
teachers are more likely to train crooks than radicals").
60. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOwA L. REv. 19, 33 (1991)
(stating that the risk for men in the legal academy to discount, dismiss, or not comprehend
feminist scholarship is "greater in the case of conclusions based on women's experiences
because much of women's experience has been buried from male view").
61. Delgado, supra note 40, at 1362 (identifying this practice as another device of the
"neo-imperial scholars" to resist outsider scholarship).
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an "us versus them" (men versus women) mentality. 62
These biases preclude a clear understanding of the messages of
critical scholarship, which are expressed in a variety of
communicative styles. These styles are grounded not in abstract
theory but in the everyday reality of women, people of color, and
other disenfranchised groups whose experiences of struggle are
always juxtaposed against the reality of a dominant social, economic,
and political matrix that would otherwise ignore their experiences
and silence their messages.
The feminist and critical tax literature is ultimately well served
in a forum such as this. The path of knowledge has never detoured
around controversy, and as a result, new strains of thought will
emerge from the cloudy wort of conflicting ideas. In the conclusion
of this article, I offer a few thoughts about what alternative
scholarship can provide to the advancement of more constructive and
sensitive taxation policies.
I. NORMS AND LIBERALISM, OR "THE MORE THINGS CHANGE..."
Liberal feminism was the dominant strain in the women's
movement in the 1960s and 1970s, owing much to strategies adopted
by women's groups that were modeled after the civil rights
movement that preceded it. The prevailing goal that feminists
adopted was formal legal recognition of their equal standing with
men. One consequence is that liberal feminism has focused upon the
commonalities of women and men, rather than their differences, with
particular emphasis on women as individuals. Women in the 1960s
and 1970s were engaged in the market labor force and were pursuing
higher education in greater numbers than ever before, necessarily
bringing them into domains previously reserved almost exclusively
for men. Concerns over the independent financial station of women
emerged as an issue, eventually finding their way into the academic
writings, including the taxation literature. 6
Most notable among the tax literature of the liberal feminist ilk
is a 1971 piece written by Grace Blumberg.' This trailblazing article
on the disincentive effects of the tax code on working wives is a
classic. Blumberg outlined the taxation structure for married couples
and then demonstrated that for a wife who wished to perform market
62. Cain identifies the "us-versus-them" perspective as a favorite device of male
academicians to dismiss feminist scholarship. See Cain, supra note 60, at 33.
63. See BERRY, supra note 6, at 33-48, 69-80; DAVIS, supra note 6, at 59-63.
64. See Blumberg, supra note 22.
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labor, the graduated rate structure taxed her first earned dollar at the
marginal rate of the last earned dollar of her husband. 5 She traced
the development of this phenomenon to its origins in the 1948 tax
reforms.6 6 In addition, she offered an enlightening analysis of the
provisions of the (now rescinded) Section 214 dependent care
deduction.67 Blumberg found disincentive effects in Section 214 as
well, again due to the aggregation of marital income. The deduction
was available only up to an income ceiling above which it was
unavailable, serving as a further discouragement to married women
to work in the paid labor market.' Because of these dual
disincentive effects, she called for elimination of the income splitting
provision and a return to the pre-1948 practice of individual taxation
filing,69 as well as a lifting of the maximum qualifying income
requirement for married couples to claim the childcare deduction.70
Blumberg believed that women's increased participation in the labor
market was advantageous because it increased their level of
autonomy. This market entry both bolstered women's financial
security interests and helped them to "get a sense of themselves from
the productive work they do."17 1 Housework, on the other hand, was
characterized as "redundant and stultifying."'72
Anne Alstott borrows from the analytical approach employed by
65. See id at 52-53.
66. See iL at 50-58.
67. See id. at 67-80. The section 214 deduction has been replaced by the section 21
dependent care credit, see I.R.C. § 21 (West Supp. 1998), which is calculated as a
percentage of childcare expenses (30% for a person with an Adjusted Gross Income of
$10,000 per year) incurred as a necessary expense of the taxpayer's gainful employment.
This credit is not refundable, and is phased out as income increases (reduced by one
percent for each $2000 of income exceeding $10,000).
68. The original section 214 deduction carried no maximum income limitation for
gainfully employed single taxpayers with children under the age of 12 or other
dependents who could not care for themselves. See Blumberg, supra note 22, at 67.
69. See id. at 95. Individual filing was also advocated by Davis, Gann, and Munnell.
See Davis, supra note 22, at 198-99; Gann, supra note 22, at 39; Munnell, supra note 22, at
278.
70. Blumberg believed that retention of the maximum income limitation applied to
married couples claiming the section 214 deduction should have been tied only to the
working wife's income, because her function as the sole provider of child care subjected
only her prospective income to expenses associated with securing such care for the
purpose of engaging in gainful employment. This argument, which recognized the wife's
legitimate claim to the dependent care deduction, served as an additional justification for
Blumberg's call for a return to mandatory individual tax returns. See Blumberg, supra
note 22, at 79.
71. Id. at 94.
72. hI at 94-95; see Maureen Maloney, Women and the Income Tax Act: Marriage,
Motherhood and Divorce, 3 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 182-210 (1989) (discussing
household income and how to reconcile individual taxation with ability to pay objectives).
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Blumberg, extending and expanding its scope for the 1990s in her
recent article Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices.73 Alstott employs elements of a liberal analysis
in that she does not challenge the validity of the existing social or
institutional order but seeks approaches to securing feminist goals
within the present structure.74 Her comparative study of tax policy
options seeks to promote three feminist goals. The first two-
achieving equal treatment and encouraging market work75-- come
directly out of the liberal legacy. The third goal-assisting
caregivers76-- reflects a basic change of attention in defining feminist
priorities, and has become a leading feminist theme this decade."
Alstott's main argument underlines the trade-offs and compromises
inherent in pursuing multiple goals simultaneously,78 and in this she
reveals herself to be eminently pragmatic. 79 The limitations of
approaches that strike compromise are obvious, and will not be to the
liking of certain feminists who seek sweeping institutional change,
but many will not reject a measured approach to change, as reflected
in the notion of accepting "non-ideal justice."80
Zelenak greets the Blumberg work with high praise for being
"careful to distinguish between intended and accidental ways in
which the tax laws discourage wives from working outside the
home."'" This seems to comport with his personal preference for
73. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional
Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996).
74. Alstott refers to the traditional tax policy criteria of "neutrality," "efficiency,"
"political feasibility," and "ability to pay," throughout her piece. See id.
75. See id. at 2004.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 53.
78. She examines five proposals employing different tools available within the tax
system: (1) individual filing, (2) reduction of tax rates for working married women, (3)
caregiver support through family allowances, (4) a combination of a revamped dependent
care credit and Social Security reform, and (5) establishment of a Child Support
Assurance System (CSAS) that uses tax law and reformed family law in tandem. See
Alstott, supra note 73, at 2006-66.
79. Alstott states that her "[a]rticle focuses on relatively incremental tax proposals
because they have been most often discussed and because they are at least in the ball park
of politically feasible changes." Id. at 2022.
80. Alstott's article invokes the spirit of what Margaret Jane Radin calls "non-ideal
justice," which involves the process of asking: "[G]iven where we now find ourselves,
what is the better decision? In making this decision, we think about what actions can
bring us closer to ideal justice." Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1990).
81. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1574. Professor Zelenak does not explain the
significance of separating the accidental from the intentional origins of disadvantageous
legislation. It seems to me that in either case the immediate concern is to address the
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seeking solutions within the existing political order to secure the best
chance to arrive at "reasonable-and politically feasible-reform
proposals."" He tips his hat to Alstott as well for her approach that
"emphasizes the dilemmas posed by conflicting feminist goals and the
limitations of tax-based solutions."
Zelenak praises these works for reflecting his favored approach,
employing his ideal of approaching tax law with a "detached and
disinterested frame of mind."' These are road markers for Zelenak's
liberal paradigm of taxation analysis that constitutes the only "right
way" to proceed. "Detached and disinterested" may be taken to
mean "neutral" and "objective." 6  Within the liberal normative
structure, taxation must be "neutral" because neutrality reflects the
role of government as a fair broker between parties with competing
interests!' This belief in neutrality in turn implies that in a society of
autonomous individuals, these competing interests are the products
of their free and unconstrained social preferences, thus restricting the
legitimate role of taxation policy to self-contained, "tax-internal"
considerations. 8 By extension, this liberal approach is a recipe for
harm and remedy its cause, regardless of intent.
82. Id at 1576.
83. Id at 1525.
84. Id at 1578.
85. Id at 1575. This process of examining tax provisions with undesirable effects for
disadvantaged populations involves another prescribed procedure. Zelenak writes that
one should "[flirst, ask if the impact was intended by Congress. If it was not, ask what
legitimate purpose the provision serves. Finally, try to find the best balance between
eliminating or ameliorating the adverse impact, and serving the provision's legitimate
purpose." Id
86. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 175
(1990). Professor Schlag comments on the assumptions of normative legal thought:
The very first move of normative legal thought has been to assume
automatically, as a matter of its own form, that it is authored by and addressed to
an autonomous, coherent, integrated, rational, originary self, receptive to moral
argument through a medium of language that is itself weightless and neutral.
Id.
87. See supra note 21 (commenting on the liberal tradition).
88. See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339
(1994). Zelenak favors eliminating the joint marital tax return, but in reformulating
allocation rules for income from property, rejects proposals that would explicitly
encourage the transfer of property ownership from higher income spouses (typically
husbands) to their lower earning partners (typically wives) for the purpose of increasing
women's property ownership and attendant economic and social power. See id. at 380
("A feature as central to the individual income tax as the treatment of spouses should be
designed to produce appropriate tax policy results, not to push the ownership of marital
property in any particular direction."). Professor Zelenak expresses no objection to the
prospect of property acquisition by wives from their husbands, so long as it is not a
product of deliberate design in tax legislation. See id. at 385. He does not state his
criteria for what constitute "appropriate tax policy results," however.
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only modest, piecemeal reform of the taxation system at any given
time, since the political imperatives in enacting adjustments to the
taxation structure require legislators to weigh carefully the competing
goals and adopt measures that will really create the desired effects
and which are arrived at by careful and reasonable means.
Zelenak embraces those articles that do not "rock the boat," so
to speak, that frame their arguments within the safe contours of the
existing political agenda and the terms of established tax policy
criteria,89 seeking reforms that do not jeopardize the status quo. He
rejects out of hand those pieces that share the common thread of
challenging the basic premises of taxation policy, most notably some
variation of the theme that taxation, far from being a neutral
instrument of the polity, is permeated with all the biases of the ruling
class that shapes and maintains its contours. Being first a product of
politics, taxation's most conspicuous characteristics are those of the
political power represented in its provisions. The works that Zelenak
criticizes question the foundations of convention, and in so doing, are
breaking the prescribed rules of "proper" legal discourse, and
therefore, according to Zelenak, must be accorded their proper
disposal in the academic dustbin. It is ironic that he celebrates that
"the days of such rarefied formalism are gone forever,"9 for through
his own insistence upon a narrow path of discourse, he demonstrates
that those days have not quite departed the scene.
II. WHO NEEDS HISTORY?
Women's history provides vital links in the process of feminist
discovery, supplying revelatory perspectives on the everyday
obstacles that have confronted women over the centuries-from the
viewpoint of women. Moreover, women's history provides continuity
and purpose to the pursuit of our contemporary feminist endeavors.
The face of patriarchal oppression may change over time, but its
character is as consistent and reliable as the inevitable darkness of
night. Stepping out of place and time into another's shoes in a
different day casts fresh light on our own world and recontours its
landscape.
Feminist historical studies have permeated the legal literature
for some years now, and have plotted new directions in areas as
diverse as tort,9' family law,92 and criminal law. 3 Feminist historical
89. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
90. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1580.
91. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
1854 [Vol. 76
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scholarship in tax law has produced a relatively small body of work to
date, but what has been produced has offered invaluable insights94
into the cracks of what often seems an impermeable casing
surrounding the taxation structure that defies understanding. Of
particular merit is the pioneering work of Carolyn C. Jones, whose
1988 article on the history of the joint marital tax return 95 revealed
the largely unexplored influence of popular attitudes about "the
proper roles of women and men in society"96 on the policy process
that ultimately resulted in the 1948 reforms that gave us the
"marriage bonus/penalty."'  Her discoveries of what conventional
Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); A.J. King, Constructing Gender: Sexual
Slander in Nineteenth-Century America, 13 LAw & HIST. REv. 63 (1995); Carl Tobias,
Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359 (1989).
92. See, e.g., B. Brooklyn, Nothing to Lose: Women and Divorce in South Australia,
1859-1918, 8 LAw CONTEXT 5 (1990); Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical
Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REV. 879 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work- The First
Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J.
1073 (1994); Symposium, Women, Legal History and the American West, 7 W. LEGAL
HIST. 193 (1994).
93. See Jeffrey P. Gray, Was the First Woman Hanged in North Carolina a "Battered
Spouse"?, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 311 (1997).
94. One of the slogans utilized by leaders of the nineteenth-century suffrage
movement was the "no taxation without representation" battle cry borrowed from the
American Revolution. There was vigorous anti-tax sentiment during this period,
particularly among middle and upper class women who owned property. See Carolyn C.
Jones, Dollars and Selves: Women's Tax Criticism and Resistance in the 1870s, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REv. 265, 269-71. Professor Jones explores the metaphorical meaning of tax
resistance efforts as well as that contained within the word taxation to represent the
systematic denial of women's standing as sovereign individuals and their exclusion from
participation in the affairs of state through maintenance of the mythic "separate spheres"
doctrine that consigned women almost exclusively to the "private" realm of hearth and
home. For a broad examination of the foundations of the suffrage movement, see ELLEN
C. DuBois, FEMINIsM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978).
95. See Jones, supra note 33.
96. Id. at 261.
97. Id. at 260. Previous scholarly analyses focused almost exclusively on formal
legislative and judicial processes. Jones's inquiry revealed that this style of scholarship
"neither carefully considered why we have the joint return nor the ways in which the joint
return and other income-splitting decisions reflect societal assumptions." Id. Her
extensive research into the popular discourse of the time, through magazine and
newspaper articles, speeches, and personal correspondence, showed that the invocation of
the income-splitting joint return was driven largely by a desire to preserve traditional
gender roles in a post-war era that had not yet come to grips with women's large-scale
entry into the "male" realms of labor and commerce. See id. at 92.
In a well-known passage of his commentary on the 1948 tax revisions, Stanley Surrey
wrote about the probable effects of the income-splitting joint return: "Wives need not
continue to master the details of the retail drug business, electrical equipment business, or
construction business, but may turn from their partnership 'duties' to the pursuit of
homemaking." Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of
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historical analyses of taxation were not turning up yielded her
important insight about the nature of tax scholarship-its tendency
"to view the tax system as a virtually self-contained world.""8 This
tendency has retarded development and acceptance of feminist
taxation perspectives because the prevailing methodology employed
within the taxation academy is conspicuously disconnected from the
experiences of real life.99 This prompted Jones to express her "hope
to develop a view of the tax system that is more exogenous than those
usually presented-one that is more connected to society's concerns
and beliefs."1 '
Mary Louise Fellows employs such exogenous factors-in this
case the marital customs of fourteenth century England-to search
out the historical foundations of current practices in marital and
inheritance law in her important and stimulating study Wills and
Trusts: The Kingdom of the Fathers.' History is especially relevant
here, for the controversy involves the tension between apparently
neutral contemporary marital laws based on the notion that marriage
is a partnership of equals and centuries of marital reality (also
buttressed by law) that dispensed with any pretense that wives were
equal to their husbands.102 Fellows focuses particularly on the
1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097,1111 (1948).
Jones also points to the reluctance with which states with common-law marital
property systems adopted community property regimes in the pre-1948 era, even though
the promise of significant tax reductions attendant to such a conversion provided a
powerful incentive for such action. She ascribes this reluctance to "a hostility toward a
wife's present interest in community earnings and property, which were usually thought of
as being the product of the husband's labors." Jones, supra note 33, at 270.
98. Jones, supra note 33, at 260-61. To illustrate this point, Jones notes that
contemporary defenses of the joint return have employed, for example, a certain reading
of the Haig-Simons definition of income, an after-the-fact argument that makes income-
splitting substantially a technical consideration within the realms of standard economic
and taxation study. See Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in
a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977).
99. See Jones, supra note 33, at 261. Professor Jones writes:
Even those scholars who have recognized the importance of societal assumptions
about marriage and the family have not used a methodology designed to expose
assumptions held by the general public. Their sources have been limited to
legislative histories and United States Supreme Court cases, documents that may
not reveal the ideas of average taxpayers or the ideas with which the average
citizen comes into contact.
Id.
100. Jones, supra note 33, at 262.
101. See Fellows, supra note 51.
102. Women have historically been treated under the law like personal property.
African-American slave women were subjected to the double indignity of racial
oppression and sexual domination. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS 217 (1991) (discussing her great-great-grandmother's purchase at the age of
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English common-law doctrine of dower, the principal means by
which wives held security interests in their husbands' property.10 3
Because wives' maintenance claims were exercised against the corpus
of the husband's real property, transfers of properties upon the death
of the husband were often complicated affairs. This inspired the
development of practices that acted much like the modem trust-
husbands selected third parties to hold title to properties while still
maintaining effective control. Since dower rights applied only to
property held in the husband's name, he could dispose of his
properties as he pleased, freed from any of his wife's claims against
them.' 4 The similarity in character that Fellows poses here between
common practices of five centuries ago and its vestiges in the present
day, manifested in such contrivances as the QTIP, is chilling. 0 5
Zelenak "selectively ignores"'0 6 Fellows' powerful historical
critique of the QTIP, choosing to remain firmly rooted in the here-
and-now. From this comfortable perspective he can safely admit that
QTIP trusts are a poor representation of the principle of marital
partnership,'" but still maintain that this downturn in no way
impeaches them for being sexist, "in either their premises or their
effects."' To prove the benign premises of the QTIP, Zelenak turns
his eye against another critical commentary, this one written by
Wendy Gerzog 09 He contends that Gerzog relies excessively on a
11 by a white lawyer and her "immediate impregnation").
103. See Fellows, supra note 51, at 146-47. Dower rights vested wives with claims to
lifetime maintenance through a one-third interest in the marital estate.
104. See id. at 147.
105. Even in more modem times, women have struggled to gain even a modicum of
control over properties within the marital estate. In the nineteenth century, legislation
such as the Married Women's Property Acts granted women greater nominal
independence, but such gains in formal law were severely checked by a number of factors.
For instance, nineteenth-century courts rendered strict readings of wives' legal marital
obligations, which obliged them to perform domestic services and provide sexual access in
exchange for material support by the husband. See Sara L. Zeigler, Wifely Duties, 20 Soc.
Sci. HIsT. 63 (1996) ("Her compensation for this labor was her support and
maintenance-room, board and other 'necessities.' The husband, in essence, hired a
woman to care for himself and his household."). Another critical factor limiting women's
financial independence was that they were locked out of the political process because
they lacked access to the ballot box. See Jones, supra note 94, at 275.
106. Delgado, supra note 40, at 1362.
107. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1543-44. Professor Zelenak believes distrust to be
the primary motivation for a husband to use a QTIP trust for his widow. "[T]he only
reason a husband would use a QTIP trust, rather than an outright spousal bequest or a
general power of appointment trust, is because the husband fears his wife will not share
his views on the proper ultimate destination of his assets." Id. at 1544.
108. Id. at 1544.
109. See Gerzog, supra note 52; see also Wendy C. Gerzog, Estate of Clack. Adding
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passage in an article by John Beveridge" 0 proclaiming the dangers of
rules that grant widows general powers of appointment over their
deceased husbands' estates, a passage she allegedly identifies as the
"smoking gun""' that proves that the QTIP provisions were
conceived under a pall of paternalism. It is clear that Zelenak
completely misinterprets Gerzog's use of this quotation in attacking
the premises of the QTIP, believing that Gerzog found Beveridge's
paternalistic posture protecting widows against the intrigues of
charlatans the source of her judgment that the premises of the QTIP
are "degrading to women."" 2 He finds Beveridge's statement in
support of the principle of the QTIP reflective of a "non-degrading"
view that "widows have minds of their own," and accords this the
stature of a near compliment." However, he misses the key
implication of this thought. To be sure, it is not degrading to
acknowledge that widows have minds of their own. But as Gerzog
(and virtually any woman) would contend, it is decidedly degrading to
pronounce that if widows indeed possess these faculties, they should
be legally barred from using them. One can readily see that Gerzog
has no cause to rely on shaky evidence, as is made clear in her
discussion prior to the appearance of the passage in question. In
examining the features unique to the QTIP, Gerzog compares it
unfavorably to the terminable interest rule, which generally grants
the estate and gift tax marital deduction only in the event of "the
transfer of property ownership itself from one spouse to the other.""14
Insult to Injury, or More Problems with the QTIP Tax Provisions, 6 S. CAL REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 221 (1996).
110. John W. Beveridge, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction-Beneficent Intent,
Baneful Result, 44 TAXES 283 (1966). Arguing that widows are often ill-equipped to deal
with managing large sums of money and property, as well as being vulnerable to the
possible intrigues of outsiders, Beveridge supported the principles of the QTIP design,
stating: "The tax law should not offer a premium to a husband who ignores his better
judgment and grants his widow a general power of appointment leaving his children at the
mercy of any charlatan who has his widow's ear." Id. at 284.
111. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1544.
112. Id
113. Id. at 1545.
114. Gerzog, supra note 52, at 302. Other types of terminable interests (such as a life
estate) do not qualify for the marital deduction because the surviving spouse obtains only
an income interest in the underlying property. Exceptions to this rule that grant the
marital deduction are operative when the surviving spouse is given a general power of
appointment in tandem with the income interest, the combination of which is deemed to
"constitute sufficient ownership and control to require their possessor to include such
property in her estate at death." Id. at 311.
Gerzog goes on to point out that the "current distribution requirement of the QTIP
provisions is identical to the current distribution requirement of the power of
appointment exception to the terminable interest rule." Id. at 314. The difference with
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The QTIP is not intended to impart any approximation of ownership
and control powers upon the surviving spouse, raising serious
suspicions regarding the motives behind its structure," 5 and creating
the sadly ironic scenario that some long-suffering wives could best
see to their future financial stability by divorcing their husbands
before they die and leave them with a QTIP-or worse."6
As to the effects of the QTIP for those wives who endure to the
end, Zelenak suggests that widows are probably better off in a world
with QTIPs than in one without them, contending that in the case of
no QTIP option, a husband may "decide that control over the
destination of his estate is more important than tax benefits. Instead
of the outright bequest ... the widow may get nothing.""' 7  He
acknowledges that this is an unlikely prospect, because the widow can
elect against the husband's will under the forced share rules, but even
in this event Zelenak defends the virtues of the QTIP as superior to
forced share statutes that may be defeated through the husband's
"clever planning" utilizing will substitutes." 8 He then attempts to
illustrate that in many cases the present value of the future earnings
from a QTIP will exceed the value of the forced share garnered by
the widow, leaving the widow "better off" through employment of
the QTIP.119 Even if Zelenak's numbers are correct, absolute
regard to the power-of-appointment exception to the terminable interest rule is that in
the case of property over which the surviving spouse may exercise control of final
transfer, guaranteed receipt of an income stream from said property is considered a
substantively relevant aspect of ownership powers or its equivalent.
115. See id. at 314.
116. Labeling it "window dressing," Gerzog attacks the QTIP distribution scheme for
its deceptive intent, meant to "pretend to give the surviving spouse ... equivalence of
ownership." Id. at 315.
117. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1546. Zelenak suggests that in the case that a husband
is as likely as not to leave his wife either $1 million or leave her nothing, and the wife is
asked whether QTIP provisions are a good idea, "[s]he will be their most fervent
supporter." Id. It is noteworthy that in Zelenak's example, the wife has no wealth of her
own, save through her marital association, and this only a potentiality. It is also ironic
that the widow could garner as much as half the marital estate in a divorce action through
execution of equitable distribution statutes, but can run the risk of complete
disinheritance if she endures the marriage "until death do you part," illustrating the lack
of protections for women's well-being within marriage, and providing another example of \
how "gender-neutral" law can be degrading to women.
118. To be sure, the non-tax elective share rules in most states do not give women the
choice to elect against such trusts, but this does not diminish the case against the QTIP.
Rather, it makes more urgent the adoption of rules more in line with those drawn up in
the 1993 Uniform Probate Code revisions that would, if adopted, protect a widow's right
to control her share of the marital estate outright. See Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership
Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law Provides a Solution, 49 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 567,587-88 (1995).
119. Zelenak crafts an example in which a husband has a $10 million estate, and his
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monetary sums are not the most important measuring rods of well-
being. For a great many women, control of their own resources is
itself a resource worth vastly more than a dollar sign with an extra
zero behind it. Zelenak's "intuition" 120 did not pick up on this
consideration.12 ' His statement that for a widow "[h]aving her needs
met for the rest of her life is far more important than whether or not
she is able to control the fate of the $1 million upon her death"'1'
carries an air of paternalism with it, and never entertains the very
real possibility that the exercise of independent judgment regarding
the use of one's life resources is a vital "need" the QTIP in no way
satisfies.
Finally, Zelenak dismisses the feminist criticisms of Gerzog and
Fellows by insisting that "any arguable injustice caused by QTIPs to
affluent (and overwhelmingly white) widows is simply trivial."'2 He
simply doesn't get it.'" Gerzog and Fellows focus on the QTIP
provisions not out of a misplaced concern for affluent white women,
but because these provisions were drafted by affluent white men for
the benefit of other affluent white men. In a society in which wealth
is translated into social and political power, challenging the devices of
those entrenched at the head of a hierarchy oppressive to women of
every stripe is not a trivial exercise but a necessary one.
III. WHAT'S THE "DIFFERENCE"?
In the wake of a decade that had seen America embittered and
embattled over the outcome of the Vietnam War, the Watergate
wife has no money in her estate. After giving $600,000 to his children, he places the
remaining $9.4 million in a QTIP. In the absence of a QTIP the husband leaves the wife
nothing, prompting her to elect a forced share of one-third of the estate, or $3.3 million.
Assuming a 5% discount rate on the QTIP, the present value of her life estate (projected
over 11 years) is $3.9 million. Zelenak claims this illustrates how a QTIP "may redound
to the benefit of widows." Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1548. On the other hand, his
illustration does not project the future value of her forced share amount, which if invested
wisely, could amount to considerably more than the sum garnered through the QTIP after
the same 11 year period.
120. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1546 ("[Mly intuition is that widows probably fare
better with the QTIP than they would without.").
121. It is noteworthy that Zelenak is quite cognizant of the importance of control of
the disposition of assets to husbands who opt for QTIP trusts for their spouses, yet
curiously indicates that widows probably would (and perhaps should) place a lesser
premium upon control of their portions of the marital estate, and might do "less well" if
they did opt for control. Id. at 1547.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1549.




scandal, the Arab oil embargo, a crippling recession with high
inflation, and finally the Iran hostage crisis, a conservative social and
political backlash occurred that swept Ronald Reagan to the White
House and inspired the nostalgia craze that permeated everything
from clothing to television shows, but which also sanctioned a
tolerance for selfishness, the so-called "Me Generation."
Amidst this climate of self-indulgence, psychologist Carol
Gilligan published in 1982 her now classic work In a Different
Voice,"5 which immediately inspired a new wave of literature
appearing under the general heading of "cultural feminism. '126  In
circles of legal criticism, commentators began to argue that a
jurisprudence grounded in an ethos of care will result in different
(and often better) legal rules than those spawned from an ethos of
rights.12 7 Some scholars have used Gilligan's research to attribute
greater values to women's nurturing characteristics and roles.-8
Others employed Gilligan's findings to critique the dominant
ideology129 in such areas as: legal education,130 legal practice, 3'
125. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). This book sets forth differences in the approaches of
girls and boys to moral reasoning. In general, the males emphasized the autonomy of the
individual and the ethos of rights, whereas the females emphasized communitarian values
and the ethos of care. Gilligan noted that studies of moral development throughout the
history of modem psychology (represented by Freud, Piaget, and Kohlberg) have equated
"normal" human moral development with the ultimate adoption of universal principles of
justice based on rules and rights, which happen to reflect the development path followed
by boys. Girls, meanwhile, are often found to deviate from this path, leading to Gilligan's
summation that "when women do not conform to the standards of psychological
expectation, the conclusion has generally been that something is wrong with the women."
IL at 14. Gilligan believes that this skewed orientation in development theory is
reflective of a societal structure that emphasizes individual identity and achievement
rather than a human nature that displays a balance between attachment and separation,
identity and intimacy, and love and work. See id. at 151.
126. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803,
835-38 (1990) (describing cultural feminists as those focusing on women's differences
from men and embracing "woman's different voice" as "good").
127. See GILLIGAN, supra note 125, at 73, 100. Gilligan considered neither approach
superior-seeing both as useful, but different, ways of resolving moral and social issues.
128. See Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
LJ. 183,193 (1994).
129. Scholars have pointed out the importance of exploring the "ethic of care,"
independent from its connection to gender. See JOAN TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES:
A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE (1993) (examining at a philosophical
level what an ethic of care would be); Stephen Ellman, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for
Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665 (1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look
At Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 75,77 (1994).
130. See, e.g., Christine M. Wiseman, The Legal Education of Women: From "Treason
Against Nature" to Sounding a "Different Voice," 74 MARQ. L. REV. 325 (1991).
131. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal
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children's rights, 32  employment discrimination,'33  sexual
harassment,TM  mediation, 13  reasoning, 36  corporate law,'37 tort138
(including negligence'39), contract law,'4 racial discrimination,'141 and
rights of AIDS victims. 142  Other works focused attention on
countering the conservative ascendancy in the political and popular
cultural realms during these years, including works advocating
progressive taxation and distributive justice. 3
Marjorie Kornhauser's article in defense of the principle of
progressive taxation, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income
Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction,144 has become a classic in
both the taxation and feminist catalogs. What makes this article
unique is Kornhauser's ability to incorporate a feminist principle (the
"ethic of care") 45 into the philosophical framework of those whom
Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 29 (1987); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and
Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.i. 853 (1992).
132. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to
Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15 (1986).
133. See, e.g., Paul Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas After Stotts: A
Narrative on the Role of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment
Discrimination Doctrine, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1985).
134. See, e.g., Note, The Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace, 18 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 795 (1992) (discussing men's and women's
different perceptions of sexual harassment).
135. See, e.g., Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and
Problems, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 21 (1984).
136. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989).
137. See, e.g., Lahey & Salter, supra note 11.
138. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in
a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989).
139. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988).
140. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 10; Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-
Colored Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous. L. REv. 791
(1991).
141. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447.
142. See Judith Areen, A Need for Caring, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1067 (1988).
143. See Handelman, supra note 50. Handelman uses Gilligan's work In a Different
Voice to argue against the ABA's position that an attorney should be free to advise a
client to take a client-favorable undisclosed position on a tax return, even if the position is
probably wrong, as long as the client's position would have a "realistic possibility of
success" in litigation. See id. at 54 n.76. She believes that a return position which
"challenges ... politically authorized judgments" (legislative, judicial, or administrative)
should be permissible only if the challenge is disclosed on the return. Id. at 64.
144. Kornhauser, supra note 49.
145. See GILLIGAN, supra note 125, at 74. Kornhauser writes: "Women perceive
themselves, and their place in the world, in terms of caring for others, whereas men
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she is criticizing (whom she terms the "neoconservatives"),' 46 all the
while drawing her feminist case for progressive taxation in non-
gendered dimensions. Zelenak's critique of this work fails to
recognize these elements, and grossly mischaracterizes both
Kornhauser's notion of feminism as being essentialist 47 and her
interpretation of Carol Gilligan's work14 as a justification for
extending the ethic of care to include care for the "nonproximate
stranger."'149
Zelenak's first misreading pertains to Kornhauser's reference to
feminism being "less a theory than a way of knowing and of being,
experienced by a large segment of the world's population.' 50
Zelenak takes this to mean that Kornhauser's notion of feminism is
reduced "to a matter of one's sex.''5 This interpretation is patently
ludicrous and is a conspicuous example of "gendered
misunderstanding."'5 Kornhauser was merely placing feminism
within a vast spectrum of philosophies that are centered around
concepts of mutual help and commitment to community, in
contradistinction to philosophies that are based on separative,
individualistic models of human nature.Y Kornhauser notes that
philosophies abound that feature a feminist notion of
interconnectedness of humanity, in direct opposition to Zelenak's
perceive themselves and the world in terms of separateness, autonomy and universal rules
and rights." Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 508 (citing GILLIGAN, supra note 125, at 25-
51). Specifically, Komhauser cites Gilligan's profile of two 11-year-old children (a girl,
Amy, and a boy Jake) in her study of the development of the moral concepts of rights and
responsibilities, the results of which influenced Gilligan's assertions of differing modes of
moral development between males and females. See id.
146. See Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 469.
147. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1550 ("To Kornhauser, all females are necessarily
feminist, and all males are necessarily not feminist.").
148. See GILLIGAN, supra note 125.
149. See Komhauser, supra note 49, at 510.
150. lL at 506-07. In Zelenak's quote of this passage he presumptuously inserts
"approximately 50%" in brackets to quantify Kornhauser's use of the term "large
segment of the world's population." Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1550. It is clear from
prefacing this statement that she had a much higher percentage in mind.
151. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1550.
152. See Cain, supra note 60, at 33. Professor Cain believes that much of the
resistance to feminist scholarship by the predominantly male legal academy is a product
of "gendered misunderstanding," created by men's difficulty in relating to women's
experiences and by rigid adherence to an "objective" scholarship style that trivializes
feminist scholarship that is based on those same personal experiences. See id.
153. See Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 504-07.
154. Kornhauser portrays feminism, therefore, as being capable of representing the
way most people actually live their lives-in varying degrees of interrelation with others.
This is what is behind her belief that "feminism provides a flexibility that is compatible
with the idea of a variety of connections to others." Id. at 507.
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charges that Kornhauser's feminism is restricted to women's
experiences. Kornhauser cites the actions of, among others, Albert
Schweitzer and Martin Luther King, Jr., as reflecting philosophies
oriented in terms of people's needs and obligation to others as well as
themselves. 5 With all due respect, the last time I checked, both of
these individuals were men in their lifetimes.
Zelenak goes on to examine Kornhauser's employment of Carol
Gilligan's famous work In a Different Voice'56 as part of her
construction of a case for progressivity. Zelenak zeros in specifically
on the concept of an "ethic of care"'57 that is a constituent part of
Kornhauser's communitarian view for society. The ethic of care
emanates from the personal "realization that the self is not immured
in a nonpermeable plastic bubble."'58 Such a revelation is not an
experience consigned exclusively to the female domain,"' and opens
the door for expression of a "proactive" voice that initiates actions of
care for others that also enhance our sense of fulfillment.160  This
"proactive" voice is what Kornhauser terms the "female" voice,161 but
she is careful to point out that "[t]he 'male' and 'female' voices, of
course, do not belong exclusively to males and females,
respectively," 62 although the separative," 'male' voice traditionally is
the dominant, valued one." 63 If the "female" voice is given
permission to be heard in our lives, we expand our personal spheres
to include consideration and care for those whom we do not even
155. See id at 505.
156. GILLIGAN, supra note 125.
157. Id. at 74. Gilligan describes the "ethic of care" as underlain by a "psychological
logic of relationships," which shapes the contours of women's approaches to moral
problems along lines that primarily consider one's responsibilities to others. This is in
contrast to an orientation toward moral questions articulated by use of formal logic to
achieve justice, an orientation associated with men. Zelenak takes pains to emphasize
that Gilligan's theory of difference between the patterns of moral development followed
by boys and girls, respectively, is "purely descriptive with respect to children; she writes
not of how children ought to develop, but of the different ways in which boys and girls do
develop." Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1550.
158. Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 508. Adhering to this view means being
responsible not only to oneself but to others.
159. Kornhauser notes that this knowledge of concurrent autonomy and connection
reveals that "the 'male' distinction between self-interest and altruism is a false one which
disappears." Id. at 508.
160. See id. at 509.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 511.
163. Id. The male voice, when utilized as a controlling force, "informs our view of law
as a domain of rules, rights and blind justice: we are autonomous, independent beings and
the law as fashioned by men helps maintain that separateness." Id.
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know, the "nonproximate stranger."1" Zelenak attacks Kornhauser
for extending Gilligan's concept of the ethic of care to include
strangers,165 suggesting that she is taking unwarranted liberties with
the concept by stating an "imperative"'6 6 that "[w]e also must
maintain a minimal, less burdensome connectedness to the
nonproximate stranger." 67 Zelenak cites a passage from In a
Different Voice that describes the social orientation of girls in
Gilligan's study as that of the highly personalized "particular other,"
to discount the notion that the "female" voice is inclined toward
sensitivity for "the generalized other" (the nonproximate stranger).168
But this criticism misses the mark as well.
Kornhauser writes that one's concern for strangers comes out of
an omnipresent possibility that any of them may be transformed into
someone with whom we have close contact-a spouse, close friend,
work companion: "every current stranger is perhaps a person who
will one day be within the inner circle of caring."169 It is this
acknowledgment that any other person may be a contributor to one's
highest attainment of well-being that becomes the basis for a
progressive structure of taxation. If taxation is necessary (in part) in
order to see to the minimum needs of others, a minimum level of care
exhibited by any one of us will grow as our material means (and level
of well-being) grow. Also, increasing one's rate of contribution as
discretionary income increases is a contribution aimed at enhancing
other's opportunities to achieve similar levels of self-fulfillment.
164. See id. at 510.
165. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1551 ("Her assertion is not supported by any
citation to Gilligan .....
166. Id.
167. Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 510.
168. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1551. Professor Zelenak believes that Kornhauser
misreads Gilligan by adopting a version of the ethic of care that "is no longer in Gilligan's
world of describing how girls and women actually are; she is in Kornhauser's world of how
'we' ought to be." Id.
However, Gilligan's study of the 11-year-old girl Amy reveals an orientation by
which she "locates herself in relation to the world, describing herself in relation to the
world, describing herself through actions that bring her into connection with others,
elaborating ties through her ability to provide help." GILLIGAN, supra note 79, at 35. For
her part, Amy said she wanted "to do something to help other people ... because I think
that this world has a lot of problems, and I think that everybody should try to help
somebody else in some way, and the way I'm choosing is through science." Id. at 34.
Science would appear to be a realm in which the ethic of care is extended to the
"nonproximate stranger."
169. Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 510.
170. See id. at 511. Kornhauser views progressivity not as a means to redistribute
wealth, but as a way to acknowledge the support society provides that allows one to attain
a certain level of well-being; therefore, progressivity constitutes "a paying of my 'just
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Zelenak then takes a strange turn and suggests that designing a
taxation rate structure based on an interest in helping others enhance
their opportunities is a "romantic view of governmental
expenditures," when in reality the federal government spends large
percentages of its budget on items such as the national debt and the
military.17 1 I am not sure of the point he is trying to make. 72 He
seems to be criticizing Kornhauser for not explaining the use of
expenditures for "non-caring" uses, but this line of reasoning is ill-
founded because he is attempting to graft Kornhauser's vision of the
"ethic of care" onto his own normative model of government
expenditure that obviously does not feature care as its centerpiece. I
am sure that she was not expecting to be called upon to justify
expenditures on price supports for winter wheat or the next space
shuttle mission. Does some other rate structure, such as the flat tax,
better explain any of the vagaries of a fickle Congress in its
management of the nation's purse? Zelenak's criticism on this point
seems not only misplaced, but is indicative of his descent into the
realm of "nit-picking."
He concludes this myopic critique by opining that Kornhauser
believes that "the ethic of care" should govern the choice of tax rate
structure because she thinks the feminine ethic of care is morally
superior to the masculine ethic of rights. 3 Zelenak's retrenchment
into an "us versus them"1 74 perspective leads him to conclude that the
"perfect solution" to the rate structure dilemma would be to have a
flat rate tax for everyone, and that women inspired by the ethic of
care could make the system progressive by volunteering more funds
as they deem appropriate. 75  Zelenak's facetious (read:
condescending) "solution" actually reveals more truth than one
debts' to others." Id. Other means of achieving these ends are through tax incentives or
through direct government subsidy. For a classic treatment of these alternative policy
avenues, see Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L REV. 705
(1970). As a general proposition, Surrey finds direct subsidies far more effective tools in
achieving policy objectives than tax incentives.
171. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1554.
172. But it certainly looks like more "gendered misunderstanding." See Cain, supra
note 60, at 22.
173. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1555. Kornhauser views the ethic of care as being
made active through the sounding of the "female" voice. This voice is not merely the
voice of women, but is the driving force behind "parents' actions towards their children,
charitable giving, 'heroic' savings of people and animals, and volunteer services."
Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 513.
174. Cain, supra note 60, at 33.
175. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1556.
[Vol. 761866
CRITICAL TAX THEORY
might imagine at first glance. His call for women to "contribute
more"'176 to the comprehensive system out of a spirit of volunteerism
already comports with women's reality today, which sees them
contribute more on both the job and family fronts than ever before,
but without benefit of the type of support needed and offered in
Kornhauser's elegant vision.
Zelenak continues his crusade against the alleged menace posed
by difference feminism in his treatment of an essay by Gwen Thayer
Handelman 177 concerning the disparate approaches taken by lawyers
in advising their clients on gray areas of the tax laws. She focuses
primarily on an ethics opinion issued by the American Bar
Association that tells attorneys that they should feel free to advise
their clients to report, without disclosure, positions on their tax
returns that are favorable to the client but probably wrong legally,
provided that the client's position has a reasonable prospect of being
upheld in litigation."18 Handelman believes such dubious positions
should not go unreported without documented authority
undergirding them.'79
Handelman rests her position on a conception of "civic
obligation"'8 that reflects a commitment to "a comfort with and trust
in collective decisionmaking mechanisms,"'' including the legislative
processes that produce laws. By extension, if one feels a connection
with the processes that produce laws, then one is more likely to
endorse their dictates. With reference to taxation law, this
philosophy posits that "for a national community to endure, the
unifying energy of the federal income tax must be preserved, and this
is only possible if even under a self-assessment system a communal
means of settling on the content of the tax laws is observed."'"
Even though he acknowledges that Handelman makes a strong
case against the ABA position based on the inconsistency that "it is
based on a litigation model, which return preparation does not fit,"'83
176. Id.
177. See Handelman, supra note 50.
178. See id- at 64 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 352 (1985)).
179. See id. ("Any position may be reported that could be argued in court, that is, any
position that is not itself arbitrary and unreasonable."). Handelman argues that
"challenges to politically authorized judgments be identified as [not arbitrary and
unreasonable]." Id.
180. Id. at 56.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 56-57.
183. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1558. He even concedes that she states her argument
"quite eloquently." Id
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Zelenak focuses on Handelman's employment of the "ethic of care"
emanating from Gilligan's work as a weakness to any argument
advocating a political remedy to this issue. He states:
If her preferred rules are peculiarly feminist, then her
opponents can reasonably ask why feminist values should be
imposed on male attorneys with their own ethic of
autonomy. The only plausible answer is that the ethic of
care is better then the ethic of autonomy-and by extension
women are better than men.' 4
Zelenak suddenly engages in "us versus them" discourse-yet again.
Note how Zelenak prefaced his statement: "If her preferred
rules are peculiarly feminist .... " Handelman's preferred rules are
not peculiarly feminist. Indeed, she devoted an entire previous article
to the development of her position, which is based upon her belief in
understanding the legislative intentions undergirding law.85 For
Handelman, understanding the "communicative content"'86 of a
statute constitutes an act of connection with the process of law and,
therefore, enhances her ability to perform her duties as a lawyer in a
more ethical, socially responsible manner. In advocating a position
that the intentions of a law substantially define it in application, she
relies not on Carol Gilligan, but, among others, John Locke,"s who
cannot reasonably be classified as a difference feminist.
Handelman's employment of Gilligan in her later article was one of
corroboration of earlier, independent discoveries, not the source of
fresh revelations. Zelenak's decision to "selectively ignore" '
Handelman's earlier work seriously undermines his claim that she is
attempting to "invoke female superiority"'8 9 to justify her position.
Indeed, in contradistinction to certain claims he makes about the
deficiencies of critical tax scholarship, it may be fruitful to ask who is
really guilty of "selection bias."'19
184. Id. at 1559.
185. See Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art of Statutory Construction: A Tax
Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAuL L. REv. 611 (1991).
186. Id. at 651.
187. See id. at 616 n.21. Handelman refers to Locke's An Essay Concerning the True
Original Extent and End of Civil Government as the foundation for her statement that
"[a]ny authority that the words of the statute possess to bind us to a course of conduct or
afford legal protection is attributable to the authority of their source." Id. at 616.
188. See Delgado, supra note 40, at 1362.
189. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1559.
190. Id. at 1523. In the culmination of his attack on "the dangers of difference
feminism," it is instructive to note the legal case he employs to illustrate his charge. In
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), a sex discrimination claim
against Sears for underrepresentation of women in the ranks of commission sales
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IV. HousEwoRK AND SOCIAL (IN)SECURITY
One of the outcomes of the introduction of the "ethic of care" to
the feminist discussion is that the idea of care quite naturally settles
around those close to us, beginning at home. The 1990s have seen
the emergence of important new scholarship in the areas of child care
and home labor.' 91 Nancy Staudt deserves high praise for addressing
an under-discussed and very difficult subject: the valuation and
taxation of unpaid domestic labor. Her 1996 article, Taxing
Housework,19 outlines a framework for taxing imputed income
generated by women's performance of housework and childcare.
Staudt's work constitutes a giant step forward in advancing the
discourse on the vital issues of women's financial security and dignity.
In his review of this work, Zelenak defines Staudt's goal as an
attempt "to improve the lives of women who choose to devote much
of their time to unpaid domestic labor."'193 To be sure, advancing
women's welfare is the chief aim, but a significant reason Staudt
focuses attention on this issue is that for many, unpaid labor on the
home front is not a choice, regardless of marital, familial, or
employment status. 94 Zelenak pays attention to two goals that he
believes are of principal concern to feminists-"changing gender
roles, and improving the lives of women in traditional gender
roles."' 95 Although he gives Staudt credit for focusing her efforts
toward "helping women as they are,"'196 her proposals address issues
of much broader scope than this. Chief among these is bolstering the
dignity of women with home responsibilitiesY 7  Staudt proposes
positions was dismissed when the court found that women generally did not want to work
in such high-pressure employment positions. See id. at 304. Zelenak uses this case to
illustrate that feminist arguments for women's "difference" actually work against
women's efforts to achieve equality with men, leading him to warn: "A feminist who is
interested in equal rights for women would do well to stay far away from Gilligan's work;
it has more potential for harm than for good." Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1561 (footnote
omitted). This might be true, but only for women for whom "equal rights" means
possessing the freedom to become just like men.
191. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 36.
192. Staudt, supra note 53.
193. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1527.
194. See Staudt, supra note 53, at 1573. Even though the majority of women of most
every classification are engaged in market labor, Staudt notes that they are still
responsible for the vast bulk (70 to 80%) of domestic labor responsibilities. See id.
Greater wage-earning ability, therefore, "does not cause a corresponding decrease in the
level of women's housework." Id.
195. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1528.
196. Id.
197. Some feminists have (arguably) contributed to the marginalization of women who
perform substantial labors in the home by insisting that such work is "redundant and
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levying Social Security taxes on non-market domestic labor according
to a set of formulas, thereby bringing women into positions in which
they may accrue their own retirement benefits, and fostering greater
societal recognition and acceptance of women's valuable and
productive contributions. 198
Zelenak rejects the idea that counting the value of housework as
taxable income can enhance societal respect for women, finding
"[h]er claims for the symbolic value of taxing housework are
dubious."'19 9 Staudt's concerns for the welfare of women who
perform vast amounts of unpaid labor are far more substantive than
symbolic. The economic value of unpaid labor in the United States
has been estimated to range as high as 60% of Gross Domestic
Product. °0 This does not count the value of unpaid labor to those
paid workers (for example, husbands) who are freed to devote extra
time to produce additional economic value in the marketplace, extra
labor that is compensated at high marginal rates. 201 Despite the
manifest significance of work that is not only uncompensated but
largely taken for granted, Zelenak writes of these (predominantly)
women: "It is not obvious that a group widely viewed as performing
gratuitous services out of love is in need of public relations
assistance."' Indeed, he believes women would view such taxation
as a "double insult."2 3  But contrary to Zelenak's limited
consideration of only two feminist goals involving tax policy
(changing gender roles and helping women in traditional stations-
both of which comport with his liberal normative perspective), Staudt
has several good reasons for wanting to use the tax system as an
instrument of valuation for housework. Placing more women on the
tax rolls advances other important feminist goals. First, people who
pay taxes have a greater stake in the decisions and outcomes of policy
deliberations that affect them. Conversely, taxpayers are more
visible constituents to policymakers than those who do not pay taxes.
Staudt, in another recent article, argues that poor citizens in
particular who are left off the tax ledgers are largely ignored in the
stultifying." Blumberg, supra note 22, at 94-95. Staudt believes such viewpoints do not
capture "the valuable and productive aspects of the labor that many women ... find
important." Staudt, supra note 53, at 1573.
198. See Staudt, supra note 53, at 1574.
199. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1528.
200. See Silbaugh, supra note 36, at 1-2.
201. See Shurtz, supra note 20, at 516.
202. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1528.
203. Id. at 1529. In addition to the "insult" of being taxed, a tax directed exclusively at
women might also draw their ire.
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policy process by default, leaving the interests of the wealthy at the
forefront of legislative consideration.' °4  Moreover, official
recognition of the productive nature of domestic labor can aid
financially vulnerable women in numerous contexts.20 5
Despite some technical and practical difficulties in implementing
certain aspects of Staudt's proposals,0 6 this does not significantly
diminish the impact of her central statement, which is "that to
improve women's economic security, housework must be recognized
as valuable and productive."2' Whether one agrees with the specific
method employed in meeting these ends is ultimately of secondary
importance if the key issue is lost in blind pursuit of technical or
methodological perfection. Staudt's proposals are not, as Zelenak
charges, merely "a political ploy."2"5  She truly believes in the
concepts represented in her proposals, but more importantly, she
understands the importance of presenting a vision that represents a
new way of looking at a problem. I also do not agree with Zelenak's
judgment that a "critique without a workable solution does nothing
204. See Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 919, 922 (1997). Staudt notes that "by drawing lines and divisions between
taxpayers and non-taxpayers, traditional tax theorists have enabled relatively wealthy
individuals to participate in society as full citizens. At the same time, the lines have
virtually bound the poor to a subordinate position in society." Id. at 923.
205. At divorce, for instance, valuation of housework lags far below that for market
labor work, deflating the wife's contribution to the accumulation of joint property,
thereby weakening her claims to marital assets under equitable distribution statutes. See
Silbaugh, supra note 36, at 55-67.
The view of domestic labor as being grounded in love and familial affections has
negative repercussions for women working outside the home as well. Waged domestic
workers are among the lowest paid of any professional classification and are exempt from
worker protection laws under the National Labor Relations Act. The Act excludes "any
individual employed ... in the domestic service of any family or person at his home." 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). Also expressly limited are many regulations under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"). OSHA exempts employers who are
defined as "individuals who, in their own residences, privately employ persons for the
purposes of performing... what are commonly regarded as ordinary domestic household
tasks, such as house cleaning, cooking, and caring for children." 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6
(1995). Additionally, most states exempt such employers from mandatory participation in
workers' compensation programs. See Silbaugh, supra note 36, at 78.
206. Staudt's proposals have a number of structural problems that Professor Zelenak
has correctly identified, such as those associated with creating what would essentially be a
separate (but revenue-neutral) income tax on non-market household income. See Staudt,
supra note 53, at 1643. Aside from its function of legitimizing such income for Social
Security purposes (Social Security taxes can be levied only on earned income), such a
separate tax would serve no fiscal purpose and would generate additional administrative
overhead.
207. d2 at 1647.
208. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1531.
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to better anyone's situation."2 9 Staudt's work has sparked increased
debate and attention on the vital issues of household labor, its
valuation, childcare, and women's financial security interests. 21° In
these dimensions, her work is a great boon to feminist inquiry.
V. BIAS iN THE CODE: IN BLACK AND WHITE
Over the past decade or so, a burgeoning catalog of critical
writings on matters of race and civil rights has developed,
amalgamated under the banner of Critical Race Theory ("CRT").2
A consistent theme that characterizes this literature is that racism is
an inherent and deeply ingrained feature of American society, and is
therefore active in the composition and character of virtually all
social institutions. A corollary to this theme is that legal and
political institutions, and the laws and rules created by them, also
209. Id. at 1524. Zelenak's repeated emphasis on the correctness, reasonability, and
political feasibility of remedial proposals assumes some qualities of an addiction to
normativity. See Schlag, supra note 55, at 929 ("Normative legal thought is conclusion-
oriented. Among other things, this means that normative legal thought works very hard
to reach this point (the 'Conclusion'). This is the point where the payoff is to be found-
the what to do?, the prescription, the recommendation.").
210. See, e.g., Rebecca Korzec, Working on the "Mommy-Track": Motherhood and
Women Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 117 (1997); James A. McKenna,
Housekeeping Ain't No Joke: How Maine's Child Support Guidelines Can Be Biased
Against Mothers, 49 ME. L. REv. 281 (1997). For a discussion of her caregiver allowance,
see Alstott, supra note 73.
211. Professor John Calmore describes Critical Race Theory as a scholarship of
opposition that "challenges the universality of white experience/judgment as the
authoritative standard that binds people of color and normatively measures, directs,
controls, and regulates the terms of proper thought, expression, presentment, and
behavior. As represented by legal scholars, critical race theory challenges the dominant
discourses on race and racism as they relate to law." John 0. Calmore, Critical Race
Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a
Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992).
212. See Derrick Bell, White Superiority in America: Its Legal Legacy, Its Economic
Costs, 33 VILL. L. REv. 767, 768 (1988). Professor Bell points to the pivotal role played
by the slavery compromises in the processes that led to the adoption of the Constitution
by all 13 colonial delegations in 1787. The deference of Northern delegates towards their
Southern brethren over their insistence to exercise their "right" to maintain the
institution of slavery "set a precedent under which black rights have been sacrificed
throughout the nation's history to further white interests. Those compromises are far
more than an embarrassing blot on our national history. Rather they are the original and
still definitive examples of the ongoing economic struggle between individual rights
reform and the maintenance of the socio-economic status quo." Id. at 768. The rule of
law has also been vigorously employed throughout American history to promote
majoritarian interests (primarily those of the wealthy white class) at terrible expense to
other ethnic populations, including Native Americans, Chinese immigrants, and Mexican
Americans. See Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and




bear the stamp of racial bias, even when couched in formally neutral
or "color-blind" terms that embrace egalitarian principles 13  Such
critiques have recently been applied to features of the taxation
system that produce different effects (generally negative) for black
taxpayers relative to their white counterparts in provisions related to
home ownership,214 the tax treatment of married couples,215 and asset
(and wealth) accumulation.1 6  One of the most provocative
contributions to this emerging branch of critical commentary was
presented by Beverly I. Moran and William Whitford in their article
entitled A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code. 7
Moran and Whitford tested their premise that many provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code are skewed to the benefit of white
people relative to black people. Starting with an oft-cited definition
of income 2 8 for purposes of comparison, they select for examination
a number of tax "benefits" '219 (exclusions from income, deductions,
favorable rates for certain types of income, etc.) that apply to four
different areas of the Code: (1) wealth and wealth transfers; 0 (2)
213. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship
as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992). Professor Lawrence challenges the
"understanding that the dominant legal discourse is premised upon the claim to
knowledge of objective truths and the existence of neutral principles." Id. at 2253. The
language of law must necessarily contain the "positioned perspective" of those who create
it, a reality that reveals "the impossibility of distance and impartiality in the observation
of a play in which the observers must also be actors." Id. at 2252. One of the methods of
Critical Race scholarship is to overtly reject any pretense of neutrality in the expression
of majoritarian or outsider perspectives, for the act of assuming a consciously selected
position is "the first enunciating act of self-definition, and ... is testimony to the
importance of the symbolism of language in the political/cultural hegemony of American
racism." Id. at 2267.
214. See, e.g., powell, supra note 20, at 80.
215. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 20, at 45.
216. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 19.
217. Moran & Whitford, supra note 20.
218. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining
income as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion").
219. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 20, at 753-54 ("We define as a tax benefit any
opportunity for deductions or exclusions from income that deviate from the idea of a
comprehensive income tax base, or opportunities to postpone reporting income to a time
later than when it should be reported according to the ideal of the comprehensive tax
base.").
220. See id. at 755. Moran and Whitford selected four areas of the Code relevant to
the tax treatment of wealth: (1) the gift exclusion, see I.R.C. § 102(a) (1994); (2) the basis
adjustment rules at time of gift and at death, see I.R.C. §§ 1014(a), 1015(a) (1994 & West
Supp. 1998); (3) reduced capital gains rates, see I.R.C. § 1(h) (West Supp. 1998); and (4)
the realization requirement for taxation of wealth accession of many assets. See Moran &
Whitford, supra note 20, at 755.
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home ownership;2' (3) retirement plans and employment benefits; 222
and (4) the marital taxation unit.2 They aimed to measure the
comparative levels at which these benefits are utilized by black and
white taxpayers. General results of their study lead the authors to
conclude that "members of the black community receive, on average,
fewer of the tax benefits we have studied than the average member of
the white community." 4
221. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 20, at 755. Four principal provisions were
examined there: (1) the home mortgage interest deduction, see I.R.C. § 163(h)(1),
(h)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1998); (2) the deduction for state and local property taxes, see id.
§ 164(a)(1); (3) the rollover of gains on the sale of principal residences, see I.R.C.
§ 1034(a), repealed by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312(b), 111 Stat.
788, 839; and (4) the exclusion of the gain from the sale of principal residences, see I.R.C.
§ 121(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1998), a provision greatly expanded under terms of the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
222. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 20, at 755. There are four areas of focus there
as well: (1) Keogh plans, see I.R.C. § 401(c) (West Supp. 1998); (2) IRAs, see id. §§ 219,
408, an area that underwent some liberalization under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997;
(3) employer-provided pensions, see id. §§ 401(a)(1), 501(a); and (4) employer-provided
health plans, see id. § 106.
223. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 20, at 755. The chief examination here is of
the relative incidence of marriage "bonuses" and "penalties" among black taxpayers. See
id.
224. Id. at 799. The authors found the most disparities in their studies of the taxation
of wealth-producing assets, including owner-occupied homes. See id. at 769-78. Blacks
were found to seldom hold either the types or quantities of assets subject to preferential
tax treatment. See id. at 769-70. For instance, 1979 statistics showed certain "tax-
favored" assets such as stocks and mutual funds were held by whites (as a proportion of
the total population) at a rate more than six times that of the black population, and the
monetary value of these assets for those households possessing them was more than five
times higher for whites (just under $34,000) than for blacks (about $6500). See id. at 766
tbl.1 (reproduced from WILLIAM P. O'HARE, WEALTH AND ECONOMIC STATUs: A
PERSPECriVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 12 (1983)).
In the home-ownership area, not only are whites more likely than blacks to own their
own homes (based on 1987 figures, 63.8% of whites are homeowners, compared to 41.6%
of blacks), but white-owned properties tend to accrue value at considerably higher rates
than properties owned by blacks. See id. at 777-78 tbl.4 (reproduced from MELVIN L.
OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL EQUALITY 109 (1995)). Home ownership carries important
tax benefits, such as the home mortgage interest deduction, see I.R.C. § 163 (West Supp.
1998), and the exclusion on the gain of up to $250,000 ($500,000 for a married couple) on
the sale of one's primary residence, see id. § 121. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
increased this exclusion from its old level of $125,000. The new provision also allows this
exclusion to be claimed once every two years by qualifying homeowners. Because the
benefits of these provisions are positively tied to property ownership and increasing
property values, they are a special boon to white homeowners "whose average
homeowner equity increased at significantly higher rates than their black counterparts."
Moran & Whitford, supra note 20, at 777.
Tax benefits attached to participation in employer-provided benefits (pensions,
401(k) plans, and health insurance) revealed some level of increased benefit for white
workers relative to their black counterparts, but not at levels as pronounced in the study
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Zelenak contends that "their analysis is unconvincing" and
attacks Moran and Whitford on three main points. First, he rails over
their choice of the Glenshaw Glass definition of income. He claims
that "[t]he entire analysis depends on the validity of their assumption
that a comprehensive income tax base is the appropriate race-neutral
standard. ' '226 Zelenak goes on at some length comparing income with
consumption taxes, instructing us on how one's normative standard
for the tax base shapes the other parameters of analysis and that
because of this, depending on the particular base selected, one could
"conclude the Code is systematically biased against whites." 7
Zelenak believes that selection of a normative model determines the
parameters by which tax provisions are correctly judged, rendering
racial effects essentially residual or incidental affairs.P
Zelenak ventures far afield. Once again, herding Moran and
Whitford's framework into his normative corral, he asserts that their
search for racial bias is ultimately a fruitless venture because it is the
wrong search. 29 However, Moran and Whitford are not corralled
areas surrounding wealth and wealth accumulation. See Moran & Whitford, supra note
20, at 786-88. The chief influences in white workers' greater tax preferences were their
higher participation rates in pension and 401(k) programs, and greater incomes, which at
higher marginal tax rates makes the exclusion from income of these tax measures more
valuable relative to the value applied to the lower incomes of black employees. See L
The study on the marital taxation unit revealed a most interesting fact: In 1987,
income splits between black couples averaged nearly a 50/50 proportion between
husbands and wives, whereas white husbands' average income was about double that of
their white wives. See id. at 795-96. The implication of this is that given the income tax
bias against two-earner couples, "black couples are more likely to suffer a marriage
penalty, and a higher marriage penalty, than white couples." Id at 798; see also Brown,
supra note 20, at 49-52 (identifying black women's high participation rate in wage labor
coupled with pronounced wage discrimination against black men as key components that
contribute to the "marriage penalty" phenomenon for African-American taxpayers).
225. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1562.
226. Id. at 1563. Zelenak attacks Moran and Whitford for offering "no explanation of
why a decades-old Supreme Court opinion has the authority to define the race-neutral
baseline for tax analysis." Id.
227. IdL at 1565 (emphasis omitted). Zelenak states that if a consumption base were
adopted for construction of the ideal, then the current practice of taxing income from
savings, dividends, and capital gains would constitute a deviation from the ideal, arguably
constituting a tax injustice against the holders of such assets, who are predominantly
white. See id.
228. Zelenak contends that once a normative taxation baseline is established, such as a
comprehensive income base or a consumption base, any given provision measured against
the adopted norm is either "normative, or it is not. If the provision is right, it makes no
sense to examine it for racial bias relative to some alternative wrong approach. If the
provision is wrong, it should be repealed regardless of its racial effects." Id. at 1567.
229. Cf. Schlag, supra note 55, at 932 ("Normative legal thought, of course, is also a
mode of social control-both within and without the legal academy. As I've argued
throughout this article, the rhetoric of normative legal thought establishes the identity
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into Zelenak's normative pen because they sought no "race-neutral"
standard in the form of a comprehensive income tax base. My
reading of their selection of the Glenshaw Glass definition is that it is
well-known and accepted by many tax scholars.230 More importantly,
it resides in the general vicinity of what the United States
government considers an appropriate tax base.231 The Internal
Revenue Code, being the product of Congress, bears the stamp of
that politically tinged institution, and it is in its capacity as a political
document, reflecting the biases of its creators, that it provides the
foundation for their examination. Moran and Whitford do employ a
neutral standard on which they base their findings. It is called racial
equality.-32
and polices the bounds of legitimate legal thought."). By the way, the culmination of
Zelenak's diatribe is his judgment that "there is never a reason to examine a provision for
racial effects." Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1567.
230. Moran and Whitford consider the Glenshaw Glass definition of income a "ready
tool" in the service of "everyday tax policy analysis." Moran & Whitford, supra note 20,
at 753. They note that "generations of tax scholars have used this definition to craft a
conception of a comprehensive tax base." Id. (emphasis added).
Contemporary tax scholars still cite Glenshaw Glass as an important refinement in
the treatment of income taxation in American law. William B. Barker, commenting on
the development of doctrine pertaining to the mandate that taxes include "all income
from whatever source derived," writes: "Any possible limitation that the notion of
source might have had on this doctrine was finally put to rest by the United States
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. In doing so, the Court provided
an often quoted definition of income ...." William B. Barker, A Comparative Approach
to Income Tax Law in the United Kingdom and the United States, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 7,
21 (1996) (footnote omitted); see also Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion:
Congress Gets Physical but Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV.
51, 69 (1997) (referring to Glenshaw Glass as a "landmark decision" that rendered "a far
more expansive definition of income"); Steven Jay Stewart, Damage Award Taxation
Under Section 104(a)(2) of the I.R.C.-Congress Clarifies Application of the Schleier Test,
47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1255, 1260 (1997) (noting that Glenshaw Glass broadened the
definition of income).
231. Items deliberately excluded from income taxation through legislative provisions
constitute "tax expenditures," so named to identify these exemptions as equivalent to
government subsidies in fiscal effect. The federal government officially tabulates its tax
expenditure "budget" each year, a fair indication that such exclusions are considered part
of the appropriate theoretical tax base. See infra text accompanying note 236.
232. Zelenak's application of normative "neutral" baselines as a means to invalidate
Moran and Whitford's finding is reminiscent of a commentary by legal scholar Herbert
Wechsler on the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), which banned the practice of forced racial segregation in the schools. Wechsler,
who supported the decision in Brown on moral grounds, found the Court's jurisprudential
reason lacking, contending that Brown, rather than comprising a question of equal
protection guarantees, was a question of rights of association, to be answered by applying
neutral principles that would weigh the rights of black people to associate with whites
against the rights of white people not to associate with blacks. See Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1959).
Professor Charles Black responded to Wechsler by illustrating that Brown was decided
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Zelenak's second criticism is that Moran and Whitford hand-
picked the provisions of the Code for examination for racial bias,
thereby skewing the results in the directions they intended. 3 He
complains further that studies of provisions that may reveal benefits
advantageous to blacks, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) or the head-of-household filing category, are omitted from
consideration.P At first glance, Zelenak may appear to have a point.
But if one takes more than a cursory glance at the provisions selected
for study, something important is revealed. According to estimates
of the federal government's Office of Management and Budget for
1996, the value to taxpayers of major portions of the tax expenditure
budget studied by Moran and Whitford is staggering. Arguably the
most "pro-black" provision, the EITC, was worth $24.3 billion in
1996.131 However, the home mortgage interest deduction was valued
at $43 billion; favorable capital gains treatment on homes garnered
taxpayers another $20.1 billion; employer-paid health insurance was
worth $56.7 billion; and net itemized deductions landed a whopping
$72 billion in taxpayers' pockets, all of which are relatively more
advantageous to white people than to black people. 6 In light of the
huge government expenditures in the areas in question, Moran and
Whitford are more than justified in their selections.
In the third area of complaint, the solution area, Zelenak finally
has discovered terra firma. In response to the proposal that a black
Congress would be urged to eliminate section 401(k) as a remedy for
low participation by black employees, Zelenak is correct in calling for
some sort of incentive to stimulate savings behavior. 37 Likewise, the
proposal to alleviate the "marriage penalty" by allowing black
couples a choice to file separately or jointly-whichever resulted in
lower tax liability-was not a well-thought out choice for the simple
reason that, all other factors being equal, the lower aggregate
burdens on married couples would have to be compensated for by
with reference to a neutral standard-racial equality. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE LJ. 421, 429 (1960).
233. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1567-68.
234. See id. at 1568.
235. See CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: THE HIDDEN
ENTrTLEMENTS 9 (1996) (citing U.S. Office of Management and Budget figures.)
236. See id.
237. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 1571-72 (noting the paradox that a policy
prescription designed in response to low savings behavior involves elimination of what
has been elsewhere regarded as a highly successful long-term savings program-the
401(k) provisions).
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single taxpayers 38 When one examines the apparent relative
weakness of some of the proposals, one must keep in mind that
Moran and Whitford intended the concepts of these proposals to
reflect the different perspective that could be expected to emerge in
their metaphor of a Black Congress. This is a powerful image, for it
is juxtaposed against its counterpart in the real world, an
overwhelmingly White Congress.2 39 The overall impact of this work
is forceful at the very least and invites more exhaustive study that is
sure to follow-study that is sorely needed.
VI. TAx SCHOLARSHIP: DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
A. Deconstruction as Redemptive Process
Though the critical tax movement is young, a cursory glance at
the pieces examined in this Article reveals a breadth of subject
matter that points to the future expansion of this endeavor to the
frontiers of other outsider scholarship. These works examine the
taxation system neither by haphazardly foraging for flaws in
particular code provisions that do not really exist, nor by relying
exclusively on standard approaches to taxation2 40 problems that
would analogously always "fix" a darkened light fixture by inserting a
new bulb. In the house of taxation law, the inhabitants of several
rooms have been left perpetually in darkness, even after having been
fitted with a variety of new, brighter, more efficient bulbs by the lords
of the house. It is evident to the denizens of darkness that the
238. See id. at 1573-74.
239. Moran and Whitford remind us: "Black life remains largely unknown to most of
the white world, and to most white legislators." Moran & Whitford, supra note 20, at 758.
240. The problem posed by strict allegiance to normative liberal methodology is posed
by Pierre Schlag in this way:
Suppose that you are walking on a road and you come to a fork. This calls for a
decision, for a choice. So you ask your companions: "Which fork should we
take? Where should we go?" You all begin to talk about it, to consider the
possibilities, to weigh the considerations. Given these circumstances, given this
sort of problem, the questions, "Where should we go? What should we do?" are
perfectly sensible.
But now suppose that it gets dark and the terrain becomes less familiar.
You are no longer sure which road you are on or even if you are on a road at all.
... The questions (Where should we go? Which fork should we take?)
that seemed to make so much sense a short time back have now become a
hindrance.
Schlag, supra note 55, at 805-06. The critical tax movement is plotting new directions on
grounds far off the trodden paths and well-worn highways of academic inquiry. See id.
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solutions to their immediate problems reside elsewhere-in the
original, defective wiring that conducts the destructive currents of
racism, patriarchy, homophobia, or other agents that not only do not
bring illumination, but could conceivably incinerate the lives of the
entire household. Such fundamental problems suggest that a
comprehensive inspection of the larger structure is called for. This is
the mission of the critical tax project. To carry this image one step
further, when one wishes to renovate an old house, one inspects the
grounds surrounding the structure, the foundation on which it sits,
the original materials and internal layout employed in its makeup,
and then aggressively checks for rot and decay that lie hidden from
immediate view, but which can endanger the integrity of the whole
dwelling.
All outsider scholarship shares one goal in common-the end of
subordination. The emerging body of critical literature of the
taxation area bears the stamp of commitment to this goal. That the
massive effort to excavate the grounds on which the taxation
structure is situated has been joined is itself evidence of the hopeful
prospects that accompany these efforts. This is ultimately a
redemptive endeavor. To build a more serviceable taxation structure
tomorrow requires some disassemblage of the components in use
today. This, in a nutshell, describes a vital focus of the critical tax
mission-that of deconstruction of the present tax apparatus.2 41
241. Deconstruction is a term closely associated with the French linguist/philosopher
Jacques Derrida, who has examined the use of language in its dimension as a tool of social
modulation and control, noting that "the signified is inseparable from the signifier... the
signified and the signifier are the two sides of one and the same production." See
JACQUES DERRIDA, POSrIONS 18 (Alan Bass trans., University of Chicago Press 1981).
The language of law, by extension, can be viewed as reflective of those who have crafted
it. Indeed, Derrida characterizes law and the system in which it operates as forces "that
both hide and reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant forces of
society." See Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 919,941 (1990).
Another pretext of this line of legal criticism is that legal language cannot be
"neutral" and "objective," resulting in privileged treatment of favored populations.
Frances Olsen has examined the employment of dichotomy in construction of family law
doctrine. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. RaV. 1497 (1983). Looking specifically at legal definitions
that divide the "public" (market-oriented) sphere of human activity from the "private"
(family-centered) sphere in a variety of applications of law, she determined that such
arbitrary definitions have facilitated women's subordinate station relative to men due to
the systematic favoring of public sphere activities, in which men concentrate their
activities. Antidiscrimination laws governing hiring practices and qualification
requirements often do not "end the actual subordination of women in the market but
instead mainly benefit[ a small percentage of women who adopt 'male' roles." Id. at
1552. Because this public/private dichotomy is so starkly conceived, Olsen showed that
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Deconstruction is a word without a firm or generally agreed
upon meaning. However, use of the term in its dimension of
criticizing legal doctrine should not be identified as a process of
destruction.242 Deconstruction as a methodological process flows out
of the observation that if law is determined to be founded not on
static principles of right reason,243 but on definitions and concepts
that are inherently indeterminate, then the meaning of law can be
found to mirror most closely definitions assigned it by those who
have the power in society to craft policy. In this, law can be seen to
be essentially political in nature.244 Deconstruction can, therefore, be
a useful tool in the service of feminists, critical race theorists, queer
legal scholars, and other schools of outsider inquiry.
In fashioning avenues of exploration for taxation scholarship,
deconstructive examination of the use of reason in science245 and
this has severely retarded both the range and effectiveness of reform efforts aimed at
elevating women's status. See id. at 1530-60.
242. Respected scholars have expressed similar opinions. For example, Owen Fiss
once said that the scholarship associated with the Critical Legal Studies ("CLS")
movement of the 1970s and '80s threatened to hasten "the death of the law, as we have
known it throughout history." Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 16 (1986).
243. See Roberto Mangebeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1983). Unger identifies the primary focus of the Critical Legal
Studies movement as one built on the dual critiques of formalism, which "invokes
impersonal purposes, policies, and principles as an indispensable component of legal
reasoning," and objectivism, "the belief that the authoritative legal materials-the system
of statutes, cases, and accepted legal ideas-embody and sustain a defensible scheme of
human association. They display.., an intelligible moral order." Id.
244. See Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79, 84-85 (1987). Minow
credits CLS with developing four areas of ongoing contribution to the advancement of
legal scholarship. The critical scholar: (1) "seeks to demonstrate the indeterminacy of
legal doctrine: any given set of legal principles can be used to yield competing or
contradictory results"; (2) "engages in historical, socioeconomic analysis to identify how
particular interest groups, social classes, or entrenched economic institutions benefit from
legal decisions despite the indeterminacy of the legal doctrines"; (3) "tries to expose how
legal analysis and legal culture mystifies outsiders and legitimates its results"; and (4)
"elucidate[s] new or previously disfavored social visions and argue[s] for their realization
in legal or political practice in part by making them part of legal discourse." Id. at 84-85.
245. See Ruth Hubbard, Have Only Men Evolved?, in WOMEN LOOK AT BIOLOGY
LOOKING AT WOMEN: A COLLECION OF FEMINIST CRITIQUES, supra note 18, at 7.
Hubbard examines basic assumptions of Darwinian theories of the nature of men and
women, noting the parallels between the "objectivity" of the scientific observations of the
time and prevailing social attitudes in mid-nineteenth-century society. See id. at 7-32.
Mary Poovey discusses the influence of biological theories of women's sexual desire with
the formation of repressive public health policies in England aimed at curbing the spread
of sexually transmitted diseases through the imposition of strict regulations on prostitutes.
She notes that similar penalties were not pursued against their male clientele. See Mary
Poovey, Speaking of the Body: Mid-Victorian Constructions of Female Desire, in
BODYIPOLrTICS: WOMEN AND THE DIsCOURSES OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 37-38.
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economics may prove instructive for altering the domain of
discourse to include perspectives of previously excluded groups. Just
beneath the surface of apparently innocent and reasonable taxation
principles may lurk the spirit of oppression. For instance, looking at
activities that are not deemed to produce taxable value (income)
reveals what the prevailing social paradigm considers valuable.
Waged or salaried labor-that which is contracted for pecuniary
compensation in the market-is subject to taxation, but household
labor performed by a woman for her family (perhaps to the benefit of
a wage-earning husband who does not have to perform such tasks) is
not taxed because it is not "work."247 This judgment at first blush
While society often responds to what it deems to be "good" science, regardless of its
actual merit, it can also latch onto theories that are widely known to be of dubious
scientific integrity, but which are still attractive to some shadowy part of the public
psyche. Derrick Bell notes that even works that feature widely discredited "scientific"
methodology, if they strike the right tone with the intended reading audience, can serve to
stoke the fires of a persistently smoldering racism in America. See Derrick A. Bell, Who's
Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 893, 893-95. Professor Bell refers
to the public attention paid to the best-selling book The Bell Curve by Richard J.
Herrnstein and Charles Murray, which postulates that observable race and class
differences are largely traceable to immutable genetic factors. See id. The book suggests
that the comparatively lower I.Q. test scores registered by African-Americans relative to
those of Caucasians are due substantially to inherited traits that are evident even after
correcting for "oppression factors" in society that inhibit successful performance on such
aptitude tests. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEiN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 127-55 (1994).
246. See Paula England, The Separative Self. Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical
Assumptions, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 15, at 37. England challenges the
notion of the autonomous, rational individual that is the basis for many of the models of
mainstream economic analysis. She charges that because of this concept's construct of
separative human nature and its subsequent assumptions that interpersonal utility
functions cannot be compared and that personal tastes (and preferences exercised in
action) are exercised in isolation (and are therefore exogenous factors), this discourages
development of models based upon interactive economic units (such as the family) or
those that employ elements of human cooperation or empathy.
Likewise, Mich~le Pujol identifies five assumptions characteristic of neoclassical
economic theory: (1) all women are (or will be) married and have children; (2) all women
are economically dependent on a male relative (father or husband); (3) women are
naturally oriented (by biology) toward being housewives and mothers; (4) women are
unproductive in the market labor realm; and (5) women are irrational, and are, therefore,
unreliable economic agents. See Mich~le Pujol, Into the Margin!, in OUT OF TiE
MARGIN: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS 17, 18 (Edith Kuiper et al. eds.,
1995).
247. See NELSON, supra note 15, at 104. Nelson views the "noneconomic" treatment
of household production as a holdover from the common law conception of marital
coverture, in which a woman's identity (ergo, her labors) is "engulfed" by that of the
husband. See Nelson, supra note 35, at 12. By extension, domestic work is judged to be
not suitable for economic valuation, since it is performed out of love and duty. See
Silbaugh, supra note 36, at 72-80. Silbaugh demonstrates that this view of domestic labor
permeates the paid labor market as well, pointing out that paid domestic workers are
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may seem benign and even "reasonable" to many, but it confers a
discernible tax advantage to politically favored groups, particularly
the traditional married heterosexual couple, composed of a
"working" husband and a stay-at-home wife. This phenomenon is
the subject of considerable attention today.248
This also points to another important issue-that of who
participates in the taxation system. As we have seen previously,
exemption from taxation of the value of household labor excludes
those who perform such labor (typically women with young children)
from participating in the nation's social insurance programs. 249 At
the same time, many of the wealthiest individuals in society also
contribute nothing to the social insurance programs (by virtue of
their incomes being "unearned"), yet are at the center of tax policy
accommodation.20 The exemption from taxation of our poorest and
most economically vulnerable citizens appears to be an attempt to
"help" these economically disadvantaged persons, but it is help that
exacts the price of sacrificing their voices in the decisionmaking
process. Only those who are on the tax rolls have their interests
represented at the policy construction table, which has "caused tax
theorists to focus almost exclusively on the rights and responsibilities
of the relatively wealthy.""'
among the most poorly compensated of any occupational group, and endure the
distinction of having their work declared exempt from federal labor and work safety laws,
as well as from most state workers' compensation statutes. See id. at 72.
248. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997). Professor McCaffery
examines a host of taxation factors that affect economic decisionmaking of married
women, chief among these the built-in disincentives for women to perform market labor.
The combination of progressive tax rates and the nontaxability of household labor
combine to create a marital taxation "bonus" for couples with only one wage earner,
serving to discourage married women's market labor participation. See id. at 66-73. But
see Brown, supra note 20, at 45. Brown illustrates that due to the higher traditional
market labor participation of African-American women and discrimination factors that
hold wages down for African-American men, most black married couples not only have to
work to generate an adequate family income, but both parties generate roughly
comparable amounts of personal income. See id. at 49-52. At progressive rates, this
creates a higher tax burden for most African-American married couples relative to their
white counterparts. If the one-earner married couple is the politically preferred model
for society to emulate, it is clear that it is the white version of this model that comprises
the ideal. See id.
249. See Staudt, supra note 53, at 1589.
250. See Staudt, supra note 204, at 959. Staudt suggests that one of the prices of
exemption from taxation for the poor has been exemption for many wealthy individuals
from contributing to social welfare programs. See id. The exemption from Social Security
tax for unearned income is a case in point, because the majority of earnings for the
wealthiest sectors of society derive from property income.
251. Id. at 991.
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These types of "uncovering" activities serve two ends: they
brand injustices for what they are, giving faces to what has been felt
but not seen. Second, they bring the legal realm generally, and the
tax realm specifically, into the accessible arena of real human beings.
Only when taxation is seen to be not so distant from the affairs of
everyday life will active participation in its reform expand in scope.
That process is underway.
B. Incorporation of New Theory
Tax law is an especially fertile ground for the exchange of
diverse viewpoints encompassing virtually the entire philosophical
domain of outsider scholarship. The whole of critical legal
scholarship can be enhanced by incorporating taxation issues more
readily into consideration of broader legal reforms. Overcoming the
most limiting aspects of "tax myopia"' requires an awareness of the
far-reaching effects of taxation policy. The technical dimensions of
tax law should not preclude would-be reformers from incorporating
tax law into general programs of change 3 For instance, what would
a socialist feminist approach be to certain taxation issues?254
Concerning women's retirement security, such a feminist would likely
not favor a linkage between Social Security taxation and sources of
imputed income (such as housework or childcare) as proposed by
Nancy Staudt?" but might endorse a program that integrates the
Social Security and income tax systems and provides a retirement
benefit (or demogrant?56) to all citizens. Childcare might be targeted
252. See supra note 34 (explaining the concept of tax myopia).
253. Indeed, politicians are not shy about tinkering with the tax system on a regular
basis, even though most lack a formal grounding in the study of taxation. On this point,
Caron cites an article penned by a trio of former Treasury officials in which they reported
that members of Congress rely almost exclusively on committee reports to comprehend
the tax legislation they consider. See Caron, supra note 34, at 534-35 (citing Bradford
Ferguson et al., Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of
the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804, (1989)). Their apparent lack of
sophisticated knowledge of the tax code has not deterred them from creating the most
complex legislation imaginable. Given this lack of sophistication, it is somewhat
surprising that there has not been a greater body of creative commentaries on tax issues
from critical legal scholars. On the other hand, for many politicians ignorance is bliss.
See id. at 534-35.
254. For instance, how could taxation policy be employed to satisfy some of the wealth
redistribution goals for women expressed by Professor Zillah Eisenstein as part of her
version of a "platform of action"? See Zillah Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of Us:
Retrieving Publicness From the Privatization of the Globe, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 59 (1996).
255. See Staudt, supra note 53.
256. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Using Refundable Tax Credits to Help Low-Income
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for subsidy through the taxation system as well, perhaps through
earmarked support to private industry for establishment of care
facilities for the children of employees, or by direct supplemental
income aid to the working poor, particularly womenM7
How would a radical feminist approach the controversy over the
marital unit? Given that marriage is seen from this viewpoint as a
state-endorsed institution of patriarchal hegemony, the marital
taxation unit would likely be abandoned in favor of either some
variation employing the individual 8s or by recognizing intimate
personal alliances through contract.2-9  Moran and Whitford
hypothesized as to how a Black Congress might address this issue, as
well as other taxation features such as the deduction for the interest
on home mortgages.26 Fresh and innovative approaches can emerge
simply through the process of thinking about tax. In a sense, this is a
process of consciousness raising.
C. Expanding Methodology
Consciousness raising elevates our knowledge of ourselves,
which is the prerequisite for claiming our personal and collective
power. In outsider legal scholarship, no process has better promoted
awareness of the need to include subordinated groups in construction
of the law than the introduction of narrative forms of discourse into
the academic dialogue. Storytelling is a powerful mode of
communication, and is especially so when applied to legal principles.
This is so because within stories abstract principles are made
accessible, while at the same time revealing that the existence of such
principles does not always translate to their expression in the lives of
real people. Principles of personal liberty and equality of
opportunity largely define the ideals of law, but are often not active
in the experiences of women, people of color, gays and lesbians, and
Families, 35 Loy. L. REv. 117,138 (1989).
257. See Heen, supra note 36, at 199-204,215-16.
258. See Cynthia V. Ward, The Radical Feminist Defense of Individualism, 89 NW. U.
L. REv. 871 (1995).
259. See MARTHA ALBERTSON F INEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-33 (1995) (advocating the
abolition of marriage as a legal category and favoring in its stead a reconstituted legal
family category exemplified in the "Mother/Child Dyad"); Brooke Oliver, Contracting for
Cohabitation: Adapting the California Statutory Marital Contract to Life Partnership
Agreements Between Lesbian, Gay or Unmarried Heterosexual Couples, 23 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 899 (1993).
260. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 20, at 791-95 (marriage penalty); id. at 774-75
(home mortgage).
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other people living on the margins. Narratives offer ways "to
challenge the dominant mindset and present new ways of viewing the
world,"26 thus making it a preferred mode of communication for
feminists 62 critical race theorists,263 and gay and lesbian scholars.
264
Narrative commentaries in the taxation literature have been
conspicuously absent from the catalog, but the field would benefit
greatly from the introduction of this form, for taxation offers a
unique perspective in a wide range of settings from which to observe
the everyday dilemmas of welfare moMs, 265 divorcees,266 abandoned
spouses,267 retired homemakers,268 lesbian couples,2 69 and working
professionals with young children 1 0
Another means of expanding the range of discourse is through
the study of history.271 Engaging the histories of subordinated
populations is another means of revealing the ways in which
dominance has been exercised in American society and sanctioned by
law. The themes presented in these accounts can provide clues into
how such dominance is carried out in more subtle ways in
contemporary culture.2 72 This is an emerging and exciting area of tax
law, which has already yielded some most intriguing insights,273 and
261. Jewel Amoah, Narrative: The Road to Black Feminist Theory, 12 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 84, 87 (1997). "[T]he sharing of human experiences, can inform law so as
to make it more humane and more responsive to human attitudes and behavior." Id.
262. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141
(1997); Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
263. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTIcE (1987); WILLIAMS, supra note 102; Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Richard
Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95
(1990); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the
Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA
L. REV. 803 (1994).
264. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607
(1994).
265. See Shurtz, supra note 20, at 493 n.29, 520-21, 528-30.
266. See id. at 517 n.145.
267. See id. at 501 n.67.
268. See id.at 517 n.146.
269. See id. at 496 n.42, 508-10.
270. See id. at 499 n.58, 519-23 & n.154.
271. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, History's Challenge to Feminism, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1889, 1889 (1990) (book review) (describing much of contemporary feminist scholarship
as "ahistorical," and calling for an intensified search for the foundations of the social
construction of women's oppression to anchor theories that she believes are excessively
reliant upon the divergent personal accounts of women's experiences in modem culture).
272. See Fellows, supra note 51 (discussing male dominance in the law of wills and
trusts).
273. See Nancy Folbre, The Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth-
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which offers almost endless avenues of exploration.
A third and important prong of changing the direction of tax
scholarship is in applying critical methods to teaching taxation. In
other areas of law-constitutional law,2 74 torts,275 contracts, 276 and
criminal law27 7-- important themes are being incorporated into law
school curricula that show promise of improving the breadth and
depth of the training of future lawyers. These commentaries have
examined the impact of the gendered language of textbooks, the lack
of history of women and non-European peoples, and the exclusion of
the impact of class, race, sexual orientation, age, and physical
disability on matters pertaining to the application of the law and of its
composition. It is critical to be able to see the intersectionality of
these various factors in navigating the legal landscape, for these are
truly the complex and interwoven elements that shape both our
individuality and our human community. These diverse factors are
vital to the study of tax law, for taxes pertain to the activities and
resources that define everyday life.
Century Economic Thought, 16 SIGNs 463 (1991). Professor FoIbre traces the
transformation of the treatment of household labor through the Industrial Revolution,
when notions of "productive" work were transferred to stations outside the home.
Housework evolved from being classified as a bona fide "occupation" to its present
classification as a form of "leisure." See id. at 464; Alstott, supra note 73, at 2023
(observing that for most women, the well-known labor/leisure choice is in reality a
laborlabor decision); Jones, supra note 33, at 261-62 (analyzing newspaper articles,
magazine pieces, and personal letters to measure the popular climate concerning marital
attitudes that influenced the tax legislation that created the joint marital taxation unit that
is still the reference entity in place today).
274. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 264
(1989).
275. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 575 (1993) (examining the development of feminist themes in case law and
scholarship); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a
Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989) (discussing cases revealing gender bias
and doctrines amenable to feminist critique, analyzing the failure of courts to address the
history of sex discrimination underlying interspousal immunity doctrine, and suggesting
changes with regard to the standard of care, sexual harassment, valuation of homemaker
services and women's injuries); Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and
Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 495 (1988) (examining the
treatment of women and identifying the use of gendered language in casebook materials;
asserting that women's history and issues of great significance to women are excluded;
exposing subtler forms of gender bias that implicate power; and identifying and rectifying
relative imbalances of power); Carl Tobias, The Case for a Feminist Torts Casebook, 38
VILL. L. REv. 1517 (1993) (examining the need for a feminist casebook).
276. See Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts
Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985).
277. See, e.g., Mary I. Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a Text: A Feminist




The thrust of the critical tax project is directed at "reinventing"
the tax system to make it more responsive-more dedicated-to the
mission of employing law to help meet the basic needs and improve
the opportunities of those who have been perpetually locked out of
the policymaking process: the poor and the different. The key to the
success of this mission is actively expanding the scope in which tax is
viewed. Tax law should be integrated as much as possible with the
construction of comprehensive strategies for such pressing needs as
welfare reform, childcare provisions, retirement security, marital and
family law, health care, and environmental policy.
Taxation should be viewed not as a neutral bystander in the
execution of public policy, but as a positive, dynamic force of
transformative potential-a powerful tool with the ability to
encourage vital social goals and discourage undesirable outcomes, to
boost the fortunes of our most needy citizens by partially equalizing
the increasingly skewed distribution of wealth in this nation. It can
be a galvanizing force for public participation in the affairs of the
state through bringing all citizens under its canopy, and thus can be
seen not as the despised beast of burden it is so often portrayed to be,
but as a source of power for those whom have had power
systematically stolen from them heretofore.
VII. CONCLUSION
Valuable and challenging insights from the burgeoning vaults of
feminist and critical race scholarship have injected new blood into the
study of tax law. Any movement that encroaches upon established
boundaries is going to be resisted. Likewise, any new path blazed
through the wilderness will encounter its share of obstacles. But as if
riding a wave, the movement presses forward inexorably.
What will the future hold for critical tax inquiry? Will it be
taken seriously? Because the effort is a serious one today, I believe
recognition will come in some not-too-distant tomorrow. The chief
contribution this new scholarship can make is to shift the terms of
taxation discourse to bring a broader array of concerns to the policy
table in the hope that taxation may be employed as a more powerful
and flexible tool in the effort to elevate social welfare through a
higher commitment to social justice. This shift will be accomplished
not through rigid devotion to any established order or set of
normative judgments, but simply by making the study and practice of
law more sensitive and responsive to the lives of real people. This is
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what inspires and defines the mission, described by Martha Minow as
the drive to "generate ideas and practices that reinvent the terms of
justice, while also remaking teaching methods and materials,
reinvigorating scholarship and litigation, and demonstrating the
importance and power of 'bumbling through.' "278
278. Minow, supra note 1, at 138.
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